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BLAME AND DANGER: AN ESSAY ON PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION 
STEPHEN J. MoRsE1 
In less cynical times, movies about prison life often included a stock 
scene: the young offender, about to be released, has an interview with the 
warden, who is, naturally, tough but kind. The warden tells the con that 
he has paid his debt to society, that his slate has been wiped clean, and 
that he can and should lead a good life when he is released. The message 
is meant to be simultaneously descriptive and inspirational. Let us sup-
pose that the interview takes place today2 and the con is in for armed 
robbery. After listening to the warden's speech, the con replies that im-
mediately upon release he will go back to the old neighborhood, illegally 
obtain a handgun, and renew his career of armed robbery. Moreover, if 
there is any risk that a victim will identify him-precisely the reason he 
ended up in the joint on the present occasion-he will kill the victim. 
The warden (and we all) believe him. What happens next in our legal 
world? The big green door slides open and the con goes free, free to rob 
and kill. Why do we let this happen? Is there appropriate moral and 
legal reason to prevent what we fear, with altogether good reason, will 
shortly occur? 
Now let me tell another story, which is true, but much less common and 
less often cinematically portrayed. A young man involuntarily committed 
1 Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology and 
Law in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. I should like to thank Michael Davis, 
James Jacobs, Howard Lesnick, John Monahan, Dan Polsby, Kevin Reitz, and Pete 
Wales for sharing their very helpful thoughts with me. John Monahan deserves spe-
cial thanks for teaching me so much about behavioral prediction and other matters. I 
have also been stimulated by thoughtful exploration of the issues by Michael Corrado, 
Paul Robinson, Ferdinand Schoeman, and Christopher Slobogin. See Michael Corra-
do, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1996); Paul H. Robinson, Foreword to The 
Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993); Ferdinand D. Schoeman, On Incapacitating the Dangerous, 
16 AM. PHIL. Q. 27 (1979); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the 
Criminal Process, in LAw, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER (Bruce Sales 
& Daniel Shuman eds., forthcoming 1996). Finally, thanks to Randy Barnett for his 
thoughtful and thought-provoking commentary. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: 
Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REv. 157 
(1996). It is boilerplate but true that all errors are mine. 
2 Today, of course, few if any wardens would bother because the exercise would be 
considered futile. We are more cynical now, and with good reason. 
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to a mental hospital has recovered and is about to be released. He re-
ceives from his doctor a prescription for psychotropic medication and af-
tercare plans, which should together diminish the risk of relapse. When 
he is unmedicated, the patient tends to believe that various people are 
threatening him and controlling his behavior. These delusional beliefs 
sometimes cause him to strike out at those he believes are threatening 
and controlling him. Indeed, it is precisely such a scenario that caused 
the young man to be involuntarily hospitalized on this and many previous 
occasions. Each time he is treated with medication and other therapies, 
the delusions of threat and loss of control abate, and he is released. But, 
alas, each time after leaving the hospital he stops taking his medication 
and the delusions return. The present doctor is quite sure the pattern will 
repeat itself and fears that the patient may seriously injure or even kill an 
innocent person. Nevertheless, the young man is too rational, too nor-
mal, to justify continued hospitalization and the hospital releases him. 
The doctor (and we all) believe that there is a serious risk that the ex-
patient will do serious harm outside the hospital's walls. Why do we let 
the patient go free? What should we do instead? 
Although, compared to most cases of predicted harm, these cases in-
volve an abnormally high degree of certainty about a high risk of future 
serious harmdoing, they are surely not fanciful hypotheticals. They real-
istically raise the question of when and under what restraints the state 
may justifiably intervene in the life of a citizen who, at the time of the 
intervention, has neither done nor attempted present harm, but who 
poses a substantial risk of doing so. 3 The strong presumption against pre-
ventive detention and the relatively limited means to accomplish it ensure 
that, in absolute terms, the dangerous undetainables are vastly greater in 
number than the dangerous detainables, and thus represent a much 
greater risk to social safety. Such considerations are not lost on the pub-
lic or politicians. Preventive detention has expanded in recent years and 
pressure for further expansion is predictable. 
I will address the theoretical and empirical justifications for preventive 
3 Sometimes the issue is put in terms of a person's "dangerousness." There is no 
harm in such usage, as long as one remembers that dangerousness is simply an esti-
mate of the likelihood that a given individual will engage in some type of undesirable 
behavior during some time period. Although there is an unfortunate tendency to con-
ceive of dangerousness as a unitary characteristic of a person, the probability of future 
harmdoing is a function of both intrapersonal and situational variables. People with 
an enormous propensity for violence cannot hurt others when in solitary confinement, 
and even the most pacific citizens may be motivated to violence in certain situations. 
When used as a legal criterion to justify preventive detention, the vagueness of 
dangerousness can be remedied by legal specification of the probability and type of 
harm required to satisfy the criterion. Nevertheless, preventive detention criteria 
rarely specify the probability and type of harm required, thus allowing deci-
sionmakers latitude for the considerable and, all too often arbitrary, exercise of dis-
cretion. 
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detention, with special attention to the different justifications for civil and 
criminal confinement and to proposals to expand the use of preventive 
detention. The general argument is that although some forms of preven-
tive detention can be theoretically justified, the increased use of preven-
tive detention would be unwise because the resulting increase in safety 
would not justify the corresponding massive liberty deprivation. 
After prefatory remarks about the misleading nature of the assumption 
of perfect predictability in Part I, Part II turns to an exploration of the 
general justification for preventive detention and of whether the law 
should prefer a civil or criminal approach to preventive detention. Part 
III first examines two civil approaches: the involuntary civil commitment 
of nonresponsible, potentially dangerous people, and the postacquittal 
civil commitment of potentially dangerous criminal offenders who have 
been excused because they are nonresponsible. I conclude this Part with 
an extended case study of "sexual predator" laws, an increasingly popular 
type of civil preventive detention legislation. Part IV considers the crimi-
nal justice system's potential for enhancing incapacitative preventive de-
tention by imposing longer sentences on dangerous, responsible offend-
ers. Part V examines the final step: pure preventive detention , or the 
preventive detention of potentially dangerous but responsible and blame-
less agents. After rejecting the approaches to expanding preventive de-
tention that Parts Ill-Y address, I conclude in Part VI with a heuristic 
proposal to extend the crime of reckless endangerment to include the 
culpable omissions of some potential harmdoers who are aware that they 
pose a risk to others. 
I. FANTASIES, FEARS, A ND P u BLIC PoLic Y 
Some theoreticians who discuss preventive detention assume that per-
fect prediction is possible and employ political and moral theory to ana-
lyze whether preventive detention is defensible. 4 Although fanciful hy-
potheticals can be powerful tools to enhance rigorous thought, they can 
also mislead. 5 Consider the assumption of perfect predictability about 
human conduct. In principle it may be possible, but imagine what cur-
rently unimaginable power the physical and social sciences would have to 
possess and how different social life would be if such an assumption were 
true. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that our current views 
4 See, e.g. , Schoeman, supra note 1, at 27, 32-35 (focussing on moral issues regard-
ing preventive detention, after assuming that the inadequacy of available predictive 
techniques is remediable). 
5 See D ANIEL C. DENNEIT, ELBOW R o oM: TH E V A RI ETI E S OF F RE E WILL WoRTH 
WANTING 5-18 (1984) (discussing the misleading nature of "bugbear" hypothe ticals in 
discussions of determinism and freedom) ; see also D.H.M. Brooks, The Method of 
Thought Experiment, 25 METAPHILO SO PHY 71, 82 (1994) (arguing that only "natural 
possibility" should constrain thought experiments that go beyond conceptual analy-
sis). 
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about human nature and personhood and our moral and political theory 
would remain static. For example, if we could predict with certainty 
which people would cause specified harms, our view of ourselves as au-
tonomous agents would surely be altered, as would our sense of what 
duties we owe to others. Although perfect or almost perfect predictabili-
ty is not logically inconsistent with autonomy, I suspect that as an empiri-
cal matter the assumption of autonomy would diminish and that the 
sphere of duties would enlarge. After all, burdening apparently less au-
tonomous agents might not seem a dreadful liberty infringement. This is 
all hypothetical, of course, but that is the point. Good moral and political 
reasoning will depend upon the social context in which it occurs, includ-
ing the dominant view of human nature.6 
Traditional and newer forms of preventive detention address an urgent-
ly felt need to avoid feared future harms. To determine what responses 
are justifiable, we must remember that perfect or near perfect predictabil-
ity and a magic pill to reduce violent tendencies among either crazy or 
non crazy people 7 do not exist. We can never be completely safe without 
drastic intrusions on liberty that would affect far more people who would 
not cause serious harm than the substantially smaller number who would. 
Our moral, political, and legal theorizing must confront this reality. 
II. THE GENERAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND 
THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTION 
Any forward-looking form of legal regulation that aims to prevent fu-
ture harm is generally justified by every person's right not to suffer unjus-
tifiable harm and the lack of a right to inflict such harm. Preventing 
harmdoing by threat or actual restraint surely intrudes on the liberty of 
the potential harmdoer, but such an intrusion is justified in some circum-
stances by the potential infringement on the liberty of others. 
:Niost forms of preventive legal regulation, ranging from tort damages 
to imprisonment, operate only by threats of future costs for harmdoing 
and are primarily directed toward the specific, potentially harmful behav-
ior being regulated. The possible damages resulting from the improper 
6 Cf. PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE oF R EASON, THE SEAT OF THE SouL: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 309-14 (1995) (speculating On the legal 
and moral implications of a thoroughly materialist view of behavior and the technolo-
gy that would ensue); Andrew E. Lelling, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and 
the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1471, 1526-39, 1560-64 (1993) (addressing the 
consequences for criminal law and criminal responsibility if neuroscience demon-
strates that eliminative materialism is true) . 
7 I use the term "crazy" interchangeably with the term "mentally disordered," with 
no disrespect towards people with behavioral problems. For legal purposes, I prefer 
the term "crazy" to "mental disorder" and other technical terms because it is more 
descriptive of the phenomena in question and has fewer connotations about disease 
processes that beg important questions about responsibility. 
i 
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operation of an automobile may affect the potentially careless driver's 
driving, but they will not otherwise impinge on her freedom to live her 
life as she chooses. Similarly, the possible harsh punishment for a homi-
cide conviction affects only a contract killer's potential killings; otherwise, 
she can do as she pleases. 
Anticipatory confinement is a more certain means to prevent harms 
than the threat of potential, future costs. Why, therefore, does the law 
usually wait for the harm actually to occur to restrain some potential 
harmdoers physically? First, leaving people free to pursue their own 
projects, free to act in accord with their choices and to take the conse-
quences, enhances liberty, dignity, and respect for the individual as a 
moral agent-albeit at the cost of increasing risk to others.8 
Second, some forms of harmdoing are simply too trivial to justify de-
tention, even if the harm actually occurs. Incarceration for double park-
ing, for example, makes little sense according to any moral or political 
theory. 
Third, the only completely effective present method to prevent future 
harmdoing in the community-some form of preventive detention-not 
only averts the feared harm, but also interferes broadly with unrelated 
liberties.9 Our liberal society prefers to avoid such blunderbuss interven-
tions and to prevent harmdoing as unintrusively as possible, by deterrents 
aimed precisely at the specific dangerous behavior to be avoided, or by 
other less intrusive alternatives. Even potential homicide, for example, is 
prevented mostly by threats of punishment. For another example, if inoc-
ulation or quarantine could prevent the spread of a highly contagious, 
deadly disease, I assume that quarantine of a person willing to be inocu-
lated would be unjustified and probably unconstitutional. 
Although the broad, massive liberty intrusion of preventive detention 
is disfavored, there are two standard conditions that furnish justification: 
(1) the potentially harmful agent's lack of responsibility,10 and (2) the 
great danger that some responsible, potentially harmful agents unjustifi-
ably pose to society. The classic example of the former is the involuntary 
civil commitment of people with mental disorder who are a danger to 
others. 11 An example of the latter is the practice of holding some 
charged defendants without bail, because they may pose a grave threat to 
8 See Schoeman, supra note 1, at 32 (setting forth the individual autonomy argu-
ment). 
9 See, e.g., Corrado, supra note 1 (manuscript at 11) ("In [preventively detaining, 
the state] must take into account that detention not only prevents the future criminal 
activity, it prevents all sorts of unrelated lawful activity the criminal might have en-
gaged in. "). 
10 Many statutes and some commentators would characterize the criterion as lack 
of "competence," but the terminology is not crucial. The important point is that the 
agent is not rational: both "nonresponsibility" and "incompetence" capture this idea. 
11 See, e.g., CAL WELF. & lNsT. CooE § 5250 (West Supp. 1995) (permitting invol-
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society if they are released .12 
In both cases, the potential benefits of preventive detention allegedly 
outweigh its undoubted costs. The loss of liberty in involuntary civil com-
mitment is considered less onerous because the person is unable to re-
spond rationally to the law's incentive structure and, arguably, mental 
disorder has already deprived the person of "effective liberty."13 More-
over, the confinement is not punishment, at least in theory. The extensive 
liberty intrusion of bail denial is justified by the grave danger the arrestee 
presents and by strict limitations on the term and conditions of preventive 
detention. For example, the detention cannot be punishment because the 
detainee has not yet been convicted, and it will terminate relatively 
quickly upon the resolution of the criminal charges. On balance, society 
is better off if courts deny bail in such cases, even if there will be some 
number of false positives among those defendants denied bail. 14 Thus, 
untary civil commitment if a person is a danger to others or to himself or herself as a 
result of mental disorder) . 
12 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(e) (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing pretrial deten-
tion upon a finding that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably 
assure the appearance of the person as required, the safety of any other person, and 
the safety of the community). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this 
statute in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
13 Compare Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involun-
tary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, in CAROL A.B. WARREN, THE CouRT 
OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 69, 97 (1982) (suggesting that the 
argument that crazy people lack effective liberty, especially compared to noncrazy 
people, is vastly overstated) with WARREN, supra, at 202-03 (1982) (arguing that so-
cioeconomic conditions deprive most citizens, including crazy people, of effective lib-
erty) . 
14 A false positive is an erroneous prediction that an event will occur. In the pres-
ent context, it refers to cases in which a charged defendant is denied bail because we 
predict that he would offend if released, but in fact he would not. Behavioral predic-
tion need not be cast in the binary fashion indicated, however. There are many nonbi-
nary methods for characterizing risk that are far more precise and convey greater 
information. Indeed, there have been major advances in conceptualizing, investigat-
ing, and communicating predictions in the last decade. See, e.g., William Gardner et 
al., A Comparison of Actuarial Methods for Identifying Repetitively Violent Patients 
with Mental Illnesses, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 35 (1996); John Monahan & H enry J. 
Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How Meteorology Can Inform Risk 
Communication in Mental Health Law , 51 AM. PsYCHOLOGIST (forthcoming 1996); 
Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About Accura-
cy , 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783 (1994); Edward P. Mulvey & 
Charles W. Lidz, Conditional Prediction: A Model for Research on Dangerousness to 
Others in a New Era , 18 INT'L J .L. & PsYCHIATRY 129 (1995) ; Mamie E. Rice & 
Grant T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing Predictive Validity , 63 J. CoNSULTING 
& CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 737 (1995) . 
Despite the undoubted advantages of the newer methods for investigating and ex-
pressing risk, there is nonetheless still virtue in reporting rates of false positives and 
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although detention of potentially dangerous but responsible people is a 
form of permissible regulation justified by the state's interest in prevent-
ing danger to the community, courts apply it only in appropriate circum-
stances and subject to strict limitations. 15 
The legal landscape is more complex, however, than these two neatly 
distinguished justifications. Hybrid forms of preventive detention, some-
times referred to as quasi-criminal commitments, straddle the two justifi-
cations. These commitments are civil in form and require a finding of 
mental abnormality, which is a proxy for diminished responsibility. Nev-
ertheless, they are triggered by criminal justice system proceedings, they 
often involve fewer procedural protections than obtain in the criminal 
justice system, they often include looser criteria and more onerous condi-
tions than obtain in traditional civil commitment of the mentally disor-
dered, and they often appear punitive, despite the state's protests to the 
negatives. No matter how the risk data for an individual are obtained and expressed, 
a preventive detention decision and its accuracy ex post are ultimately binary: The 
potential detainee either will or will not be preventively detained and, if undetained, 
will or will not do the feared harm. The decision to detain or not to detain may be 
justified ex ante because, for example, the person's score on an actuarial method, 
which precisely identifies the risk probability the person presents, exceeds or is lower 
than the level of risk that our society has determined justifies detention. It may seem 
strange to declare a case a "false positive" or a "false negative" when the risk assess-
ment is expressed probabilistically and no specific prediction has been made. Never-
theless, the decision has binary consequences for potential detainees and society at 
large. A person who is detained and would not ultimately have behaved harmfully 
has unnecessarily been deprived of liberty. A person who is not detained and harms 
another has deprived the victim directly and society indirectly of liberty. Focusing on 
these outcomes in this way helps us keep in mind the human, moral costs of predictive 
enterprises. 
15 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (noting that the Bail Reform Act carefully 
limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious 
crimes). Why a criminal charge should justify preventive detention generally is un-
clear. Preventive detention for potential danger related to the charged offense, such 
as to protect a threatened witness, is comprehensible. But if the charged defendant is 
simply dangerous generally, it is difficult to understand why preventive detention is 
more justifiable than for any other person posing an equal risk of similar harmdoing. 
The claim that the criminal charge is good evidence of dangerousness is an evidentiary 
argument rather than a principled reason to distinguish charged offenders. It is per-
fectly plausible, for example, that the con in the introductory example is more predict-
ably dangerous than many people charged with serious offenses. Albert Alschuler 
argues that a probable cause determination of past misconduct does provide a predi-
cate for prediction because it is some indication of culpability. As he recognizes, how-
ever, probable cause is not proof of guilt and it hardly seems sufficient to overcome 
the usual presumption against preventive detention. Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive 
Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 510, 532-34 (1986). 
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contrary. 16 
For example, traditional mentally disordered sex offender commit-
ments are triggered by either a charge or a conviction of a sex offense17 
and depend on a finding that the offender is mentally abnormal. 18 These 
commitments, which have been held constitutional, may be more onerous 
than civil commitments and may be accomplished with fewer procedural 
protections than obtain in the criminal justice system.19 The offender's 
diminished responsibility and the commitment's origin in a criminal 
charge or conviction justify the hybrid nature of the commitment. Com-
mitment after acquittal by reason of insanity is another example of a simi-
larly justified hybrid. A criminal defendant found legally insane is com-
mitted to a hospital for a potentially indefinite term after proceedings 
that may provide fewer protections than are available in the criminal jus-
tice system and more onerous conditions for release than obtain in ordi-
nary civil commitment.20 
16 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S . 364, 377-79 (1986) (Stevens, J ., dissenting) 
(describing the criminal character of Illinois's "sexually dangerous person" proceed-
ing); cf id. at 368-69 (majority opinion) (conceding that if the conditions of confine-
ment were clearly punitive, the "civil veil" might be pierced and criminal procedural 
protections would be required). 
17 The term "traditional" is meant to exclude newer "sexual predator" commit-
ments, which occur at the completion of an offender's prison term for a sex crime. For 
a discussion of these newer commitments, see infra Part III.C. 
18 Mentally disordered sex offenders are seldom sufficiently mentally abnormal to 
warrant either the insanity defense or traditional involuntary commitment. See dis-
cussion infra Part III.C. 
19 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375 (holding that proceedings under the Illinois Sexually 
Dangerous Persons Act are not proceedings in a "criminal case" within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment, and thus that Amendment's guarantee against compulsory 
self-incrimination does not apply). 
20 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367-69 (1983) (holding that: (1) a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard for involuntary, indefinite commitment of in-
sanity acquittees comports with due process, and (2) the length of an insanity acquit-
tee's involuntary commitment depends upon his or her recovery, and thus the 
commitment may be of a much longer duration than an appropriate criminal sen-
tence); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (holding that the contin-
ued involuntary detention of an insanity acquittee, no longer suffering from mental 
illness, on the basis that he cannot demonstrate that he is not dangerous to himself or 
to others, violates due process). This term of commitment must end when the patient 
either regains mental health or is no longer dangerous. See id. at 77 ("[T]he acquittee 
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer."). But see 
State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 106-10 (Wis. 1995) (purporting to distinguish Foucha 
by holding that the continued commitment of an insanity acquittee who is no longer 
mentally ill does not violate due process if the acquittee is dangerous, there is a "med-
ical justification" to continue the commitment, and the commitment does not exceed 
the maximum term of imprisonment that could have been imposed for the crime 
charged). 
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Under current legal arrangements, many people who appear to pose a 
great risk of serious harmdoing may not be preventively detained either 
because they are responsible and no pure preventive detention scheme 
has been devised to detain them, or they are arguably not responsible, 
but do not meet the usual criteria for involuntary civil commitment and 
no hybrid has been devised to detain them. Examples of the former are 
the con and patient described at the beginning of this Paper; an example 
of the latter would be a "mentally abnormal arsonic predator," for whom 
no specific commitment exists. 
Should the law prefer civil or criminal approaches to preventive deten-
tion? Paul Robinson responds with an admirably strict version of "the 
traditional account. "21 He asserts that the moral legitimacy of the crimi-
nal law requires that offenders receive punishments that are proportion-
ate to their culpability. If punishments are too harsh or excuses too re-
strictive, harmdoers may be punished more than they deserve, thus 
undermining the criminal law's legitimacy. The criminal sanction should 
apply only to those who are blameworthy, and then strictly in proportion 
to the offender's desert. Preventive detention of nonresponsible, blame-
less agents should therefore be solely the province of the civil justice sys-
tem. As noted , this is the standard account, and I subscribe to it fully, 
because it takes seriously and affirms the human potential for responsi-
ble , moral agency. 
The standard account assumes that there is a difference between civil 
and criminal confinement marked by the differential purposes, attendant 
stigmas, procedures, and conditions of confinement. Punitive purpose is 
a necessary condition of criminal confinement, whereas civil confinement 
does not aim to punish.22 Criminal confinement brands the detainee as 
blameworthy; civil confinement stigmatizes the detainee as nonrespon-
sible.23 Civil commitment does not require the same procedural protec-
tions as criminal incarceration because the detention is not punishment 
and does not carry the same stigma. The only limits to the conditions of 
21 See Robinson, supra note 1, at 706-08 (setting forth the traditional account 
against a criminal approach to preventive detention). 
22 But see Lord Windlesham, Punishment and Prevention: The Inappropriate Pris-
oners , 1988 CRIM. L. REv. 140, 146-47 (arguing that the conditions in which civil 
detainees are confined are indistinguishable in most respects from criminal restric-
tions on liberty) . 
23 A legal finding that an agent is nonresponsible and dangerous is of course also 
stigmatizing, but this is not the stigma of moral culpability that in part creates the 
need for the greater procedural protections of the criminal justice system. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (citing the stigma of criminal conviction as one 
justification for the reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases). But see Michael 
Davis, Arresting the White Death: Preventive Detention, Confinement for Treatment, 
and Medical Ethics, APA NEWSL., Spring 1995, at 92, 95 (arguing that the stigma in 
such cases is properly moral, because dangerousness is a type of reckless endanger-
ment and is thus in itself wrongdoing). 
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criminal confinement are the wide borders of the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments; civil confinement condi-
tions should be the least intrusive necessary to meet the state's reason to 
detain. Of course, the legal and institutional world is rarely so neatly 
carved and skeptics may deny that practical differences exist. 24 Neverthe-
less, the law's failure fully to honor important moral distinctions does not 
undermine their importance and the necessity of attempting to design 
and implement rules and institutions that express them. 
If one subscribes to the standard account, there are three means to 
increase preventive detention: (1) expand civil preventive detention by 
substantially widening the criteria for both nonresponsibility and danger-
ousness; (2) expand criminal preventive detention by justifying the fair-
ness of lengthier incarceration of defendants convicted of serious crimes; 
and (3) expand civil preventive detention to permit commitment of re-
sponsible and blameless but dangerous agents. 25 The next three Parts of 
this Paper consider these alternatives. 
III. ExPANDING CIVIL CoMMITMENT oF N o NRESPONSIBLE PEOPLE 
For the standard account of the distinction between criminal and civil 
confinement to obtain, the blameless must not be punished , and non-
responsible but potentially dangerous people must be preventively de-
tained within the civil system. The first two subsections that follow con-
sider mechanisms for civil commitment of nonresponsible people: preven-
tive civil detention of nonresponsible, potentially dangerous people, and 
excusing and civilly committing blameless harmdoers. The last subsection 
addresses the new "sexual predator" commitment laws. Assuming that 
legislatures allocate the necessary resources, expanding civil commitment 
could substantially enhance public safety. But, expansion would also un-
dermine the legitimacy of the criminal law by excusing properly blame-
worthy agents , by threatening basic liberties, and by permitting society to 
ignore the social causes of violence. 
A. Preventive Civil Detention of Nonresponsible, Potentially 
Dangerous People 
Would society be better off if involuntary civil commitment criteria 
were broadened to permit preventive detention of even more potential, 
rather than actual, harmdoers? Although one can mount a good theoreti-
24 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why 
No t?, 72 YAL E L.J. 853, 865-68 (1963) (arguing that the insanity defense is not a 
defense, but rather a means to restrain some members of the group of defendants who 
would ordinarily be free of criminal liability). 
25 In the remainder of this Paper, I shall refer to this possibility as "pure preventive 
detention," signalling that the commitment lacks a nonresponsibility or therapeutic 
rationale. Its purpose is solely to prevent predicted harm. 
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cal argument to support narrow involuntary commitment laws, the argu-
ment for broader commitment criteria is more problematic. In addition, 
any form of preventive detention in the absence of actual harmdoing 
raises grave practical questions.26 
For reasons much studied and theorized about, but in fact not very well 
understood, some unfortunate people are so irrational, so grossly out of 
touch with reality, that ascribing responsibility to them is a travesty ac-
cording to any but the most extravagantly libertarian account of human 
agency. This is not to say that such people are totally incompetent. They 
are able successfully to perform many of the tasks of everyday life. Nev-
ertheless, their practical reasoning is sometimes so irrational that respon-
sibility for some conduct is out of the question. If their irrational practi-
cal reasoning increases the risk that they will cause harm to others-or 
perhaps to themselves-the usual liberty and autonomy justifications for 
allowing people to pursue their projects, to make wrong and foolish 
choices, are not present. These justifications are rooted in the capability 
for rational conduct. Consequently, the state is theoretically justified in 
intervening if the consequential benefits of the intervention outweigh the 
costs: permitting people incapable of rationality to cause harm irrational-
ly does not enhance liberty and autonomy. 
For example, the best recent evidence concerning the relation of 
mental disorder to violent conduct suggests that there is a weak but genu-
ine positive association.27 In brief, some people with mental disorder 
tend to be violent as a result of mental disorder, especially if they have 
certain psychotic symptoms28 and if they are also substance users.29 The 
26 I have argued primarily on consequential grounds against any form of involunta-
ry commitment for people with mental disorder. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for 
Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 
CAL. L. REv. 54 (1982). I still believe that argument is correct, but for the purpose of 
this discussion I will acknowledge both the acceptability and the inevitability of invol-
untary commitments for dangerousness. 
27 See Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal 
Behavior of Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls, in VIOLENCE AND 
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK AssESSMENT 137, 154 (John Monahan 
& Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) (noting that the preponderance of recent research 
suggests that the mentally ill are "somewhat more likely to be violent" than those who 
are not mentally ill); Jeffrey W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and 
Community Violence: An Epidemiological Approach, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DIS-
ORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra, at 101, 119 (finding a weak but 
robust association between mental disorder and violence, an association that strength-
ens as the definitions of mental disorder and violence widen). 
28 See Link & Stueve, supra note 27, at 156 (concluding that certain psychotic 
symptoms that cause a person to feel threatened elevate rates of violent behavior in 
people with those symptoms). 
29 See Swanson, supra note 27, at 119 (concluding that mentally disordered individ-
uals who were also substance abusers are significantly more likely to be violent than 
124 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:113 
psychotic beliefs that external factors are controlling one's conduct and 
that others are threatening may predispose some people with mental dis-
order to behave violently.30 Assuming that such delusional beliefs are 
firmly held, an agent who strikes out at a perceived controlling threatener 
is not morally responsible for the attack and does not deserve legal blame 
and punishment. If a person expresses these delusional beliefs, and espe-
cially if she has acted violently in response to them in the recent past, she 
plausibly poses a substantial threat to others. Assuming that she has not 
competently chosen to forego treatment that would prevent the return of 
such beliefs, she is not responsible for her potential dangerous propensi-
ties and the state would not unjustifiably violate her liberty right by 
preventively detaining her.31 Of course, if reasonable, less intrusive 
forms of intervention, such as outpatient commitment or mandatory visits 
by a nurse to ensure medication adherence, were available, incarceration 
should not result.32 
The hypothetical case of a grossly irrational person falls within tradi-
tional, narrow justifications for involuntary civil commitment. Most of 
the people who create fear that they will be violent and who in fact actu-
ally harm others do not fit this description, however. The vast majority of 
people with mental disorder, including severe psychotic disorders, do not 
pose greater risk than noncrazy people, and the number of noncrazy but 
dangerous people is much larger than the number of dangerous crazy 
people. Thus, to promote public safety by preventive detention will re-
quire expanding the civil criteria of nonresponsibility to include many 
people hitherto considered perfectly responsible. 
How could the law broaden the class of nonresponsible agents? First, it 
could assume that anyone who would unjustifiably hurt another person 
must be irrational and thus nonresponsible. Such an assumption col-
lapses the categories of madness and badness, sickness and evil, and evi-
dences a failure of nerve about the very possibility of objective criteria 
for rationality and moral judgment.33 Exploring the virtues and defects 
those with mental disorder alone). Even in these cases, however, most such crazy 
people do not behave violently, and especially not seriously violently. But some do, 
and at rates higher than among noncrazy persons of similar background. 
30 See Link & Stueve, supra note 27, at 149-53 (describing research results on the 
correlation between certain psychotic symptoms and violence). 
31 In contrast, people with disorders who have a propensity to violent conduct that 
is unrelated to their disorder are not appropriate subjects for civil commitment be-
cause their violence is not irrationally motivated. 
32 I have argued elsewhere that the ease of involuntary hospitalization may have 
the effect of discouraging the search for reasonable alternatives. See Morse, supra 
note 26, at 103. This concern has lessened in recent years, however, because cutbacks 
in funds allocated to state and community mental hospitals and clinics have both lim-
ited the availability of intensive inpatient treatment and enhanced the desirability of 
creating successful outpatient alternatives. 
33 My use of the word "objective" here does not betoken allegiance to any form of 
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of such a project is beyond the scope of this Paper, but it suffices to note 
that if such a world view guided public policy, none of the usual moral and 
political assumptions would apply. Moreover, such a worldview is unlike-
ly t~ gain general acceptance anytime soon, so I shall simply note it in 
passmg. 
Another, related possibility is general expansion of the criteria of ab-
normality and nonresponsibility. The law might consider new syndrome 
sufferers and people diagnosed as suffering from less severe mental disor-
ders as sufficiently abnormal and exempt from responsibility. For exam-
ple, "battered woman syndrome" sufferers and people with "antisocial 
personality disorder"34 or some "substance-related disorders"35 might 
qualify as sufficiently abnormal or nonresponsible. Nevertheless, ex-
panding the categories of abnormality and nonresponsibility again faces 
conceptual and practical difficulties. 
Although there are working definitions of mental abnormality, disor-
der, or disease that command wide allegiance,36 no consensually accepted 
definition of these or like terms exists within the mental health profes-
sions, and none of the prevailing definitions was created to address moral, 
political, social, and legal problems, such as who should be considered a 
responsible agent. 37 Therefore, simple inclusion of a syndrome or disor-
metaphysical moral reality. It simply refers to the intersubjective agreement reason-
ably informed people might reach based on good reasons and good evidence, without 
which effective human interaction is impossible . 
34 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 645-50 (4th ed. 1994) (hereinafter DSM-IV] (describing this dis-
order). 
35 !d. at 175, 176-81 (substance dependence), 182-83 (substance abuse). 
36 For example, the introduction to DSM-IV states: 
(E]ach of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behav-
ioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
associated with present distress ... or disability ... or with a significantly in-
creased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. 
In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely an expectable and cul-
turally sanctioned response to a particular event. .. . Whatever its original cause, 
it must currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral , psychological, or 
biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior ... nor con-
flicts that are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders 
unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual 
!d. at xxi-xxii. But see Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A 
Conceptual Critique ofDSM-III-R's Definition of Mental Disorder, 99 PsYCHOL. REv. 
232 (1992) (criticizing the definition of "disorder" in DSM-IV's predecessor, DSM-
III-R, a definition that remains unchanged in DSM-IV). 
37 Indeed, DSM-IV explicitly cautions against using its diagnostic criteria to re-
solve legal issues. See DSM-IV, supra note 34, at xxvii ("The clinical and scientific 
considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may 
not be wholly relevant to legal judgments . .. that take into account such issues as 
individual responsibility, disability determination, and competency."). 
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der in some reasonable diagnostic scheme cannot resolve whether a suf-
ferer, even if "abnormal," is sufficiently nonresponsible to warrant pre-
ventive detention. Making this decision requires a theory of 
responsibility and a moral and political theory about the limits of liberty. 
Examination of current involuntary commitment criteria and practice 
discloses that, with few exceptions, only severely disturbed, highly irra-
tional people are committed involuntarily. Although the civil commit-
ment reforms of the 1960s and thereafter did not accomplish as much as 
advocates hoped,38 there is widespread agreement that, on both liberty 
and consequential grounds, involuntary commitment should be limited to 
the most disordered people. People with lesser disorders are too much 
like "us," too rational, to qualify as nonresponsible. For example, it is 
almost unimaginable that a person whose sole diagnosis was "antisocial 
personality disorder" and who was potentially dangerous would be com-
mitted involuntarily. Although a large proportion of serious violent of-
fenders in prison meet the criteria and could have been civilly committed 
if "antisocial personality disorder" satisfied the mental disorder criterion, 
the law treats people with this disorder as responsible moral agents be-
cause they are in touch with reality and not substantially irrational. 
Furthermore, the ability of mental health professionals to predict fu-
ture violence among mental patients may be better than chance, but it is 
still highly inaccurate, especially if these professionals are attempting to 
use clinical methods to predict serious violence. 39 High proportions of 
38 See PAULS. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAw AND 
THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 210 (1994) (concluding that the consequences of mental 
health law reforms were much more limited than anticipated) . 
39 See Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others , 
269 JAMA 1007, 1009 (1993) (reporting: (1) 60% sensitivity (true positive proportion) 
for clinicians' predictions of violence, compared to an expected chance accuracy rate 
of 50%; and (2) no increase in accuracy with patients the clinicians judged to be espe-
cially dangerous). This study, which is one of the most methodologically sophisticated 
and persuasive to appear in the literature, demonstrates that clinicians are "relatively 
inaccurate predictors of violence." !d. at 1010. Clinicians ' predictions of violence 
exceeded chance for male patients, but for female patients their predictions were not 
significantly better than chance. /d. Moreover, the sample in this study was particu-
larly violent , suggesting that the sensitivity of violence predictions would decrease in a 
random sample of emergency room patients. !d. at 1009. Finally, although the sam-
ple was probably unusually violent, only 14.4% of the violent occurrences involved 
serious violence. ld. The study also concluded that it was unclear whether using 
clinical judgment to predict violence was more accurate than simply using a history of 
violence. /d. at 1010. For a second analysis of clinical predictive accuracy, see Moss-
man, supra note 14, at 788-90 (reanalyzing 58 data sets from 44 disparate published 
studies which demonstrate that: (1) clinicians ' predictions generally exceed chance, 
but that errors are inevitable; (2) past behavior is the best predictor of future violent 
conduct; and (3) nonclinicians furnished with data about past behavior may out-
perform clinicians who rely solely on data gained from a clinical interview); see also 
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false positives will ensue, especially if one is predicting low base-rate be-
havior, such as homicide or aggravated assault. 
One can of course reasonably argue about what society and the law 
should consider sufficiently serious violence to justify preventive deten-
tion.40 For example, Charles Lidz, Edward Mulvey, and William Gardner 
found that within their particularly violent sample, thirty-two percent of 
the predicted violent patients and eighteen percent of the comparison 
group committed acts of hitting or striking, a category the investigators 
placed between "minor violence" and "serious violence."41 It is difficult 
to tell from the report, but apparently few of the hittings or strikings re-
quired the victim to receive medical attention. Should we be willing to 
David B. Villeneuve & Vernon L. Quinsey, Predictors of General and Violent Recidi-
vism Among Mentally Disordered Inmates, 22 CRIM. JusT. & BEHAV. 397, 406-09 
(1995) (investigating a sample of high-risk, recidivist, mentally disorderd offenders for 
an average 92-month follow-up period after their release from a treatment facility, 
and finding: (1) 78.3% of the sample were rearrested, of which 49.6% were arrested 
for a violent offense; (2) an actuarial prediction instrument was a modest predictor of 
general recidivism, yielding a 31.7% relative improvement over chance; (3) only 
16.7% of the initial rearrests were for a serious violent offense, a figure so low that 
accurate identification of this latter group using generally more accurate actuarial 
methods was precluded; and ( 4) the presence of psychosis decreased the rearrest risk 
for a violent offense). But see Robert Menzies & Christopher D. Webster, Construc-
tion and Validation of Risk Assessments in a Six-Year Follow-Up of Forensic Patients: 
A Tridimensional Analysis, 63 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 766, 775-76 
(1995) (reporting on the basis of a careful, sophisticated study of a high-risk sample 
that: (1) neither actuarial nor clinical prediction is highly accurate and that little pro-
gress on the risk assessment of people with mental disorder has been made; (2) with 
few exceptions, the direct predictions of dangerousness "were almost universally inva-
lid(;]" (3) even those risk assessors who were best at the task provided predictions 
that were "neither powerful nor pragmatically of any value[;]" and, (4) a handful of 
sociodemographic variables were far better predictors than clinical assessments and 
actuarial instruments) . This study "demonstrates once more that the 'holy grail ' of 
violence prediction is still far off." /d. at 775. In general, actuarial prediction is supe-
rior to clinical prediction. See generally Robyn M. Dawes et al. , Clinical Versus Actu-
arial Judgment, 243 SciENCE 1668 (1989). But highly accurate prediction of future 
violent conduct by any method, even among high risk groups, eludes us. 
Optimists about prediction sometimes overstate the accuracy rates found in more 
recent research, neglect the methodological flaws or cautions of newer work, lump all 
"violence" together, or fail to discuss adequately the trade-off between sensitivity and 
specificity. See, e.g., Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of 
Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PuGET SoUND L. REv. 709, 735-54 
(properly criticizing flaws in the older research, but making some optimist's errors). 
4° Cf. C.M.V. Clarkson, Law Commission Report on Offenses Against the Person 
and General Principles: (1) Violence and the Law Commission , 1994 CRrM. L. REv. 
324, 327-29, 331-32 (discussing the British Law Commission's assessment of the seri-
ousness of various forms of assaultive behavior). 
41 See Lidz et al., supra note 39, at 1009. 
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detain preventively those who might punch or kick other people, for ex-
ample, when it is extremely unlikely that these assaults will be serious 
enough to occasion medical treatment? Preventive detention in such 
cases will surely require stronger justification than in the case of potential 
serious bodily injury, homicide, rape, arson, and the like. By reducing the 
degree of potential violence necessary to justify preventive detention, the 
law would prevent a small amount of serious harm and a somewhat larger 
amount of less serious harm, but only at the cost of increasing the number 
of false positive predictions of both, especially the former. Only the pre-
vention of serious violence renders preventive detention cost-benefit jus-
tified, even among nonresponsible, potential harmdoers, especially be-
cause most disorders and associated problems can be treated more 
effectively and inexpensively in the community.42 
Expanding the abnormalities sufficient to justify involuntary civil com-
mitment would be demeaning and an affront to the civil liberties of large 
numbers of people. Many new and old syndrome sufferers experience 
distress or disability, might very well benefit from treatment, and some-
times threaten harm to others. But to brand people reasonably in touch 
with reality as nonresponsible is to demean them and to undermine re-
sponsibility ascriptions generally. Unlike the civil commitment of actual 
harmdoers that is triggered by a successful insanity defense in the crimi-
nal justice system, involuntary civil commitment of potential harmdoers 
requires no actual harm or attempt. Threats will suffice. In the absence 
of recent, harmful behavior, however, the generally weak ability to pre-
dict future serious violence becomes even worse.43 Consequently, the 
false positive rate will soar. Large numbers of people who in fact present 
no threat will languish in expensive hospitals that have few effective treat-
ments to reduce their violence potential.44 
42 CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SmuLKIN, MENTAL HosPITALIZATION: MYTHS 
AND fACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 152-80 (1987) (concluding, based on empiri-
cal evidence, that "alternative care is more effective and less costly than mental hospi-
talization"). The claim is not that everyone can be treated more efficiently outside 
the hospital. Rather, it is that inpatient hospitalization is necessary for too few people 
with mental disorders to justify the expense and intrusiveness of maintaining an ex-
tensive system of inpatient treatment. See also Burton A. Weisbrod, A Guide to Ben-
efit-Cost Analysis, as Seen Through a Controlled Experiment in Treating the Mentally 
Ill, 7 J. HEALTH PoL. PoL'Y & L. 808, 835-36 (1983) (analyzing data demonstrating 
that alternative community care is more effective at the same cost as traditional hospi-
talization, especially for people with schizophrenia and nonschizophrenic psychoses, 
but that community care may not be as cost-benefit justified in monetary terms for 
people with personality disorders). 
43 See Mossman, supra note 14, at 789-90 (reporting that past behavior is the best 
predictor of future violence). 
44 In the case of seriously crazy people, whose irrational practical reasoning leads 
to the intent to do harm, ameliorating the crazy thinking through proper medication 
should in fact reduce the risk of harmdoing. I know of no study that demonstrates 
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Preventive detention of an expanded class of allegedly nonresponsible , 
potentially violent people, should be rejected as a means to promote pub-
lic safety. We cannot justly solve our social problems by "medicalizing" 
them and then granting the state otherwise unjustified powers to control 
the lives of citizens.45 It is no solution to the problems that impulsive, 
angry young men produce, for example, to redefine them as sufficiently 
"sick" to warrant preventive detention. Violence is sometimes the prod-
uct of gross irrationality and all violence is ultimately perpetrated by indi-
viduals who form the intention to do so. But not all actual or future vio-
lence is the symptom of a disorder, and environmental conditions do 
make a difference in both the rate and type of violence that occurs. 
Medicalizing harmdoing locates the source of violence firmly in intraper-
sonal pathology, thus undermining responsibility and permitting society 
to avoid understanding and ameliorating social conditions that contribute 
to individual evil. 
B. Excusing and Civilly Committing Blameless Harmdoers 
If the justice system excuses a criminal offender for the same reason 
that renders the offender dangerous as well as blameless, then civil re-
straint is a possible response. Unlike most prison sentences , which are of 
limited duration, postacquittal civil restraint is in principle indefinite , ter-
minating only if the conditions rendering the agent nonresponsible and 
potentially harmful abate. Consequently, an excused offender might be 
civilly detained for a period longer than the sentence that might have 
followed a criminal conviction. Current criminal law is not terribly for-
giving, however, and, for example, few offenders are acquitted by reason 
of insanity.46 All citizens are expected to fly straight, even if it is difficult 
to do so for personal or social reasons. Furthermore, almost no excusing 
condition also renders the excused harmdoer potentially dangerous and 
thus a fit subject for postacquittal civil commitment. Indeed, legal insani-
ty is the only doctrine that excuses from responsibility adults who are 
dangerous for precisely the reason-sufficient irrationality-that they are 
this, but the conception of human action as rationalized by practical reason seems to 
entail it. For people who are not grossly irrational, however, the relation between 
their disorders and future violence is often tenuous at bes t. Treatment that would 
permit early release of such people is likely to be expensive, time consuming, and 
ultimately ineffective. 
45 See Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control , 18 ANN. REv . Soc. 209, 
223-24 (Judith Blake & John Hagan eds., 1992) (describing one consequence of medi-
calization as the individualization of a collective social problem). 
46 See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET A L., BEFORE AND A ITER H INCKLEY: EvALUATING 
INSANITY D EFENSE REFORM 27-28 (1993) (finding in a study of four States that the 
insanity plea was raised in just under 1% of ali felony cases, the acquittal ra tes varied 
from 0.12 to 0.41 per 100 felony indictments, and the success of the plea as a percent-
age of pleas raised ranged from 7% to 46% , with an overall success rate of 23 % ). 
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excused.47 Yet legal insanity is a relatively narrow defense. Unless it 
were expanded to cover cases never before encompassed by the defense 
or unless new excuses were created, few offenders will be excused and 
preventively confined for potentially indefinite periods. 
Substantial expansion of criminal excuses to permit the consequent ex-
pansion of civil commitment would be unsuccessful or unwise. The irra-
tionality tests for insanity, such as the federal test48 or the first prong of 
the Model Penal Code,49 could be broadened simply by requiring less 
irrationality to excuse. Such a move has limits, however. A defendant 
reasonably in touch with reality, although also mentally abnormal, is ar-
guably sufficiently rational to deserve punishment. Moreover, juries will 
not find a defendant legally insane unless the defendant is obviously and 
grossly out of touch with reality. Attitudes about culpability might 
soften, of course, but this does not seem likely in an era when society 
demands more, rather than less, criminal punishment. 
Those dissatisfied with the alleged narrowness of irrationality tests 
have proposed and sometimes achieved the adoption of control tests.50 
The apparently inexorable wave of adoptions halted abruptly in the wake 
47 Compare a hanndoer excused because she was acting under duress. In virtually 
all cases, there is no reason to believe that the coercion applied in the current situa-
tion is a general feature of her life. Continued restraint of the hanndoer to prevent 
future occurrences of coercion is unnecessary. 
Automatism might seem to be another doctrine that excuses defendants for the 
same reason that they are dangerous. Properly understood, however, many cases of 
automatism negate the act requirement of the prima facie case and thus are not ex-
cuses. In some jurisdictions, however, the defendant must plead legal insanity if au-
tomatism is produced by mental disease or defect. I believe that dissociative states, 
which often support automatism claims, should be treated as a potential excusing con-
dition, rather than as denial of the act. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 
U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1641-52 (1994) [hereinafter Morse, Culpability and Control]. 
Current law is often to the contrary. See MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 2.01(2)(b)-(c) (1985) 
(excluding a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep and conduct under 
hypnosis or posthypnotic suggestion from the definition of a voluntary act). 
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) ("It is an affirmative defense ... that , at 
the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a 
result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and 
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts."). 
49 MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 4.01(1) (1985) ("A person is not responsible for criminal 
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks 
substantial capacity ... to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness J of his conduct 
.... "). 
50 The most influential is, of course, the Model Penal Code's second prong. Jd. 
("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity ... to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law."). 
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of Hinckley,51 however, and many jurisdictions deleted the control test. 
Some believe that this is unjust because it is unfair to blame and punish 
people who cannot control their conduct.52 I have argued elsewhere that 
most arguments about the meaning of loss of control or volitional dys-
function are confused and that most plausible control difficulties are bet-
ter understood as rationality problems. Consequently, it is fair to omit a 
control test.53 Even if a control test were available and interpreted 
51 United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), clarified, 529 F. 
Supp. 520 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
52 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1, at 703 n.35 ("(T]o exclude the possibility of 
exculpation on [the ground of control dysfunction] is to create the possibility for con-
victing blameless offenders."). Professor Robinson also suggests that narrowing the 
insanity defense to exclude a control test may have exceeded the community's expec-
tations of justice. He bases this view on very interesting empirical research that he 
and psychologist John Darley performed. They presented subjects with vignettes 
about criminal conduct to test whether the criminal law was congruent with the com-
munity's expectations of justice. The results from the part of the study that used a 
vignette of an allegedly mentally disordered agent indicated that the subjects thought 
a control test was appropriate. PAUL H. RoBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, JusTicE, 
LIABILITY, AND BLAME: CoMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 128-39, 262-65 
(1995). 
I believe that the general "vignette" methodology has serious problems and fear 
that Robinson and Darley's specific vignettes perhaps "stacked the deck" unfairly in 
favor of a control test. Even if their result is valid, however, its normative implication 
is unclear. The question for a desert theorist is whether some otherwise rational de-
fendants are in fact unable to control their conduct. Many commentators deny this on 
conceptual and empirical grounds. If they are right-admittedly a big "if"-the fol-
lowing question arises: Should the public's unjustified belief justify the adoption of an 
unjustifiable defense? Robinson and Darley are surely correct that the legitimacy of 
the criminal law is undermined if it is too inconsistent with the public's sense of jus-
tice. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the law should promulgate a rationally indefen-
sible rule simply because the public demands it: The law must sometimes lead as well 
as follow. Finally, one wonders how much the public cares about a control test for 
legal insanity, compared to other possible inconsistencies. For example, suppose the 
law ignored the strong public sentiment that results matter and, following the lead of 
commentators such as Sanford Kadish, did not distinguish between attempted crimes 
and completed crimes on the theory that results do not affect the agent's blamewor-
thiness or dangerousness. See Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword to The Criminal Law and 
the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994) (arguing that differ-
ential punishment for attempted crimes and completed crimes cannot be justified in 
terms of the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law or in terms of "any con-
vincing principle of justice"). I conjecture that the public would care far more about 
this issue. 
53 See Morse, Culpability and Control, supra note 47, at 1622-34 (setting forth in 
full the argument that most control difficulties are better understood as rationality 
problems); Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 813 (1985) [hereinafter Morse, Excusing the Crazy] (arguing 
that the law should treat as instances of irrationality many cases that are now con-
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broadly, however, for the same reason given concerning the rationality 
test, it is unlikely that many harmdoers would or should be acquitted by 
reason of insanity and civilly committed. In sum, broadening the tradi-
tional insanity defense will not excuse large numbers of defendants and 
make civil commitment more generally available.54 
Proposals to apply legal insanity to hitherto excluded cases or to create 
new excuses for new syndromes often rest on a confusion and would be 
unwise. The confusion is the argument that simply because an abnormal 
condition was a cause in fact of harmful behavior, the harmdoer should 
be excused. This confuses causation with excuse. Causation is not itself 
an excuse: an abnormal condition warrants a genuine excuse only if it 
causes a genuine excusing condition, such as irrationality.55 
Most people suffering from the alleged new syndromes do not experi-
ence the gross loss of contact with reality that usually causes judges and 
juries to find offenders legally insane. Even if the new syndrome is a but-
for cause of the harmdoing, the new syndrome-suffering harmdoer will 
seldom be sufficiently crazy to warrant an excuse. Punishment will be 
deserved and excusing will undermine the legitimacy of the criminal law. 
Furthermore, excusing deprives responsible agents of dignity and threat-
ens other syndrome sufferers who have not committed harms with invol-
untary cornrnitment.56 
Consider, for example, "battered woman syndrome." Sufferers experi-
ence self-esteem difficulties, depression, feelings of helplessness, and oth-
ceived of as control problems). I also argue that we lack the clinical and scientific 
means to measure control problems, even if they are conceptually coherent. See id. at 
817 ("If or to what degree a person's desire or impulse to act was controllable is not 
determinable: there is no scientific test to judge whether an impulse was irresistible or 
simply not resisted."). Thus, on consequential grounds, too, a control test is undesir-
able. 
54 Although I believe that the insanity defense should not be broadened, I also 
strongly oppose adoption of the "guilty but mentally ill" verdict. This verdict is un-
necessary to provide treatment to prisoners fairly convicted. More important, it can 
operate as an unfair "compromise" in cases in which jurors actually believe the de-
fendant is legally insane, but reject appropriate acquittal by reason of insanity because 
they fear that acquittal will lead to early release. See Morse, Excusing the Crazy, 
supra note 53, at 803-04 (setting forth in full the argument against the "guilty but 
mentally ill" verdict). 
55 See MichaelS. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1112-
13 (1985) (demonstrating that if causation were itself an excuse, then under a deter-
minist theory, all actions would be excused); Stephen J. Morse, Psychology, Determin-
ism, and Legal Responsibiliry, in NEBRASKA SYr>APOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: THE LAw 
AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 35, 48-50 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986) (refuting the 
causal determinist theory that causation itself is an excuse). 
56 I discuss these issues in greater detail elsewhere. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, The 
"New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome", CRIM. JusT. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1995, at 3. 
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er untoward mental and emotional states.57 Nonetheless, most are firmly 
in touch with reality. Although the great majority of battered women 
who raise a claim of self-defense attacked their batterers in a confronta-
tional situation,58 among those syndrome sufferers who kill the batterer 
in a nonconfrontational situation that would not justify traditional self-
defense, few will meet the criteria for legal insanity.59 Assume, however, 
that the insanity defense were widely expanded or a discrete "battered 
woman syndrome" excuse were created that would excuse any defendant 
who could demonstrate that all the syndrome criteria were met. Many 
such killers might then be excused, but would this result be desirable? 
Do we really want to claim that these people are not responsible agents? 
What coherent theory of excuse suggests that people firmly in touch with 
reality should be considered nonresponsible and what would become of 
our notions of responsibility if the law routinely excused in these and 
similar cases?60 Moreover, unlike duress defendants, the syndrome suf-
ferer's condition of excuse is precisely what makes her dangerous. Thus, 
postacquittal commitment of some type might be justifiable. For those 
who wish to expand preventive detention by broadening criminal law ex-
cuses, this would be a desirable result, but its price would be the denigra-
tion of a class of otherwise responsible agents. 
Consider, next, "rotten social background" as an excuse. In addition to 
the conceptual and factual reasons to question whether those from a rot-
ten social background generally are not responsible for their conduct,61 
57 See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BAITERED WOMAN 31-35 (1979) (discussing 
common characteristics of battered women) . For critiques of the battered woman 
syndrome defense, see Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL L. REv. 1 
(1994) (arguing that by denying that women are capable of conforming to the law, the 
battered woman syndrome defense also denies that women have the same capacity 
for self-governance that is attributed to men); Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Wo-
man Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Ex-
cuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 58-59, 63-64 (doubting the validity of the syndrome and 
whether it is an accurate description of the victims of battering relationships and sug-
gesting that learned helplessness is not consistent with the behavior of battered wo-
men who do kill); David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619 (1986) (examining meth-
odological flaws of battered woman syndrome research and analyzing weaknesses in 
Walker's "cycle theory of violence"). 
58 Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions 
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 391-97 (1991) (reporting in her 
analysis of appellate decisions that 75 % of situations involved confrontations) . 
59 Some sufferers may be sufficiently irrational to warrant an excuse, but such 
cases are rare. 
60 See Coughlin, supra note 57, at 70-87 (arguing that routine excusing of women 
who kill their batterers undesirably treats women as less than full moral agents) . 
6 1 See Morse, Culpability and Control , supra note 47, at 1652-54 (exploring the 
issue of a history of deprivation, emotional or otherwise, as an independent ground 
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the practical and civil liberties implications of concluding that they are 
not are vast. Because so many young male violent offenders come from a 
rotten social background, a large proportion of the type of people now in 
prison would have to be excused. They could not be released, however, 
because they pose an unacceptably high risk of future violence-especial-
ly to the already disadvantaged communities to which most would re-
turn-as a result of their rotten social background and because they have 
a history of recent harmdoing. Should we convert prisons to hospitals? 
What treatments would there be-how does one "treat" a rotten social 
background? When could we be reasonably certain that the "patients" 
no longer were dangerous? Simply to ask these questions suggests a dys-
topian regime that few would find inviting. If excused harmdoers were 
released from civil commitment earlier than they would be from prison, 
deterrence and preventive incapacitation would be weakened, and the 
public would lose confidence in the legitimacy of the criminal law. The 
proper response to the social injustice that produces "rotten social back-
ground" is to remedy the injustice, not to medicalize the problem and 
excuse responsible agents. 
C. Sexual Predators: A Case Study 
The history of mentally disordered sexual offender ("MDSO") laws 
suggests that our society is particularly and deeply ambivalent about peo-
ple who commit acts of sexual violence. On the one hand , we believe that 
they are wicked and deserve substantial penalties. On the other hand, 
many people cannot fathom "deviant" sexual behavior and so tend to 
think that something must be "wrong" with "sexual deviants." People 
who commit acts of sexual violence apparently scare us more than people 
who commit other violent offenses, and attempts to restrain the former 
are routine. Legislatures have never adopted "mentally disordered ar-
sonist" or "mentally abnormal armed robber" statutes to commit such 
offenders. But MDSO statutes have waxed and waned, depending on 
public fear and the currently fashionable location of violent sex offending 
on the bad/mad continuum.62 
In recent years, MDSO legislation has been waxing once again, but 
with a twist. The newer commitment statutes, represented most famously 
for a control excuse). Among other reasons, most defendants with a "rotten social 
background" were rational when they offended and were not coerced to commit their 
crimes. And causation is not an excuse. See supra note 55. 
62 See generally Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires": The Response to the 
Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83 (1987) (presenting an overview of 
the response of the public, politicians, and psychiatrists to sexual psychopaths during 
the middle of this century) ; John F. Galliher & Cheryl Tyree, Edwin Sutherland's Re-
search on the Origins of Sexual Psychopath Laws: An Early Case Study of the Medical-
ization of Deviance, 33 Soc. PROBS. 100 (1985) (criticizing an influential account of 
the development of sexual psychopath laws). 
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by Washington's Sexually Violent Predator statute,63 provide for commit-
ment proceedings after a sexual offender has completed a prison term. 
The new commitments are thus not in lieu of criminal incarceration, but 
are allegedly genuine civil commitments. As such, they are applauded by 
those who wish to maintain the traditional dichotomy between civil and 
criminal confinement, especially if civil commitment is attended by sub-
stantial procedural protections. 54 In contrast, I believe that the civil com-
mitment of potential sexual predators or other allegedly abnormal poten-
tial offenders is unjustified and will do little to enhance public safety. 
Nonresponsibility is usually a necessary condition of justifiable invol-
untary civil commitment under the standard account of civil and criminal 
confinement, but proponents of newer MDSO laws provide no coherent 
theory to suggest that sexual offenders as a class are not responsible. To 
begin, they were not incompetent to stand trial for the triggering offense, 
nor were they legally insane when they committed their most recent sexu-
al offense.65 They were convicted and served their terms.66 Even bizarre, 
serial sexual murderers are seldom psychotic, and carefully plan and exe-
63 WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.120 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). In 1993, 
the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the constitutionality of this statute. In re 
Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993). However, in August 1995, a federal district 
court held that the statute violated the substantive due process component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 10, and the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 754 
(W.D. Wash. 1995). For interesting accounts of the passage of Washington's Sexually 
Violent Predator statute, see John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent 
Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. 
PuGET SouND L. REv. 655, 670-84 (1992); Stuart Scheingold et al., The Politics of 
Sexual Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual Predator Legislation, 15 U. PuGET 
SOUND L. REV. 809, 816-20 (1992). 
64 Brooks, supra note 39, at 718-19 (discussing the civiUcriminal dichotomy and 
noting that the Supreme Court has approved preventive detention under certain cir-
cumstances); Robinson, supra note 1, at 715 (supporting Washington's Sexually Vio-
lent Predator statute, with its system of periodic review). Bur see John Q. La Fond, 
Washington 's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or Lottery? A Response to Pro-
fessor Brooks , 15 U. PuGET SouND L. REv. 755 (1992) (criticizing Brooks's general 
position, and specifically denying Brooks's claim that it is better to preventively de-
tain two individuals, one of whom we are confident will commit another crime of 
sexual violence in the future, rather than releasing them both). 
Because the substantive criteria for most forms of commitment are so vague and 
broad, the procedural protections have less force than they otherwise might. See 
supra text accompanying notes 71-74. 
65 It is possible, of course, that any abnormality arose after the conviction, but this 
is unlikely. I shall make the simplifying assumption that the offender's mental state is 
the same at the time of the triggering conviction and of the commitment. 
66 This is also true of traditional MDSO commitments that were triggered by a 
criminal conviction and imposed in lieu of sentence. Of course, a mere sex offense 
charge initiated some traditional MDSO commitments. There is no evidence, howev-
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cute the crimes that satisfy their fantasies. 67 Nonpsychotic sex offenders 
are sufficiently responsible to deserve criminal punishment. 
Perhaps, however, the degree of responsibility required to deserve 
criminal punishment for a sexual offense is consistent with the lack of 
responsibility that justifies civil commitment. Yet it seems perverse to 
claim that a person is responsible enough to deserve criminal punish-
ment-the most serious, afflictive state intrusion on liberty-but is not 
responsible enough to avoid preventive confinement for potential 
harmdoing.68 Indeed, it seems more logical to require less responsibility, 
and certainly no more, to justify preventive detention. 
To avoid the difficulties the civiVcriminal comparison produces, let us 
simply assume that civil preventive detention should require substantial 
nonresponsibility. Are Washington's sexual predators responsible? In 
addition to the general arguments just addressed, consider the Washing-
ton statute's definition of a sexually violent predator: a person qualifies if 
he "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which 
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. "69 
In turn, a "mental abnormality" is defined as follows: 
"Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition af-
fecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the 
person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree consti-
tuting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.70 
These provisions together are vague and even incoherent definitions of 
er, that a judge or jury would have found these MDSOs legally insane if they had 
been tried. 
67 Janet Warren et al., The Sexually Sadistic Serial Killer 14, 19 (1995) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (reviewing the literature and analyzing twenty 
cases of sexually sadistic serial killers selected from files obtained by the National 
Center of the Analysis of Violent Crime of the FBI). 
68 Although the "sexual predator" has previously been convicted of actual harm-
doing, his current commitment, premised on his propensity to commit future harms, is 
unrelated to his current blameworthiness. It is this latter feature that distinguishes 
this form of commitment as civil and differentiates it from criminal confinement based 
on a preventive incapacitation rationale. Incapacitative criminal confinement makes 
current desert a necessary precondition for punishment. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING 
& GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT 
OF CRIME 73 (1995) (arguing for the importance of maintaining desert as a necessary, 
albeit not sufficient, justification for punishment) ; see also Norval Morris & Marc 
Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, 6 CRIME & JusT.: AN ANN. REv. OF REs. 1, 35 
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985) (positing as a limitation on the proper 
use of predictions of dangerousness in the criminal law that "[p]unishment should not 
be imposed, nor the term of punishment extended, by virtue of a prediction of dan-
gerousness, beyond that which would be justified as a deserved punishment indepen-
dently of that prediction") . 
69 WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1995). 
70 !d. § 71.09.020(2). 
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abnormally produced sexual danger. The former, which attempts to satis-
fy the critical nonresponsibility criterion for justifiable civil commitment, 
simply requires that an abnormality must produce the potential sexual 
predation. The terms "personality disorder" and "mental abnormality" 
must therefore do all the work. "Personality disorder" is a recognized 
diagnostic category,71 but people with such disorders are seldom psychot-
ic and rarely can avoid responsibility for their deeds. This is not a promis-
ing predicate for nonresponsibility. 
"Mental abnormality" is not a recognized diagnostic term, a point rec-
ognized by friends and foes of the sexual predator law,72 but a statutory 
term does create a legal criterion and need not precisely track terms from 
other disciplines, such as psychiatry.73 The issue is whether the statutory 
definition makes sense on its own terms. The definition states that a per-
son is abnormal if any biological or environmental variable affecting the 
person's emotional or volitional capacities predisposes the person to en-
gage in criminal sexual misconduct. But what else would predispose any-
one to any conduct, sexual or otherwise, if not biological and environ-
mental variables that affect their emotional and volitional capacities? In 
other words, the definition is simply a description of the causation of any 
behavior. For example, mental abnormality might be defined as "a con-
genital or acquired condition ... which predisposes the person:" to write 
law review articles, to read law review articles, or to engage in any other 
activity. The content of abnormality in the definition is entirely parasitic 
on the requirement of "criminal sexual acts." Nothing else in the defini-
tion differentiates the sexual predator from any other person. But if any-
one who has a tendency to engage in sexual violence is abnormal, then 
the term "mental abnormality" is circularly defined and does no in-
dependent conceptual or causal work. Moreover, such a definition col-
lapses all badness into madness. Finally, it is strange, if not incoherent, to 
define an abnormality by reference to the penal code. If the penal code 
becomes more forgiving, do the people who now satisfy the definition 
automatically become "mentally normal"? 74 
Assuming, probably erroneously, that the law could cabin the vague 
term's seemingly unconstrained reach, why any particular abnormality 
should excuse remains unexplained. As we have seen, simply because a 
mental abnormality may be causally related to other behavior does not 
mean that the behavior should be excused. 75 Once again, this is to con-
fuse causation and excuse. Causation, even by an "abnormal" variable, is 
not an excusing condition. Even if the potential predator suffers from 
71 DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 629-73. 
72 Brooks, supra note 39, at 730 (friend); La Fond, supra note 64, at 762-63 (foe). 
73 Alexander Brooks cogently makes this point. Brooks, supra note 39, at 730. 
74 In addition, the definition implies that some criminal sexual acts might not be a 
"menace," but if not, why are they crirninalized? 
75 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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some causal abnormality, it does not necessarily follow that the potential 
predator is not responsible. 
What actual theory to hold potential predators nonresponsible might 
be implicit, however? Irrationality is not a good candidate, because sexu-
al predators are firmly in touch with reality. One might try to claim that 
their sexual desires are irrational, but no adequate theory exists to distin-
guish irrational from rational desires.76 Furthermore, the instrumental 
rationality of sexual predators is entirely intact.77 They may have strange 
or alarming desires, but they are perfectly capable of planning and exe-
cuting the means to fulfill them. It is possible that the strength of their 
desires makes it difficult for sexual offenders to assess the probability that 
they will be caught, but this would not distinguish these offenders from 
other impulsive offenders, and impulsivity does not warrant an irrational-
ity excuse. 
We are thus left with some type of control theory of excuse, but what 
good reason is there to believe that sexually violent predators specially 
lack the ability to control their sexual conduct? What is there about sexu-
al desires that makes them more "compelling" than other equally strong 
desires, such as the greed that may result in property crime? Why isn't 
the "Moneyphile"78 as out of control as the person suffering from, say, 
"sexual sadism," a so-called paraphilia included in DSM-IV,79 which 
would surely satisfy Washington's abnormality requirement? Sexual 
urges, including "abnormal" sexual urges, are not irresistible forces that 
render human beings automatons. Most argument to the contrary is con-
ceptually and empirically unsupported.80 People with sexual disorders or 
other abnormalities that predispose them to sexual violence may deserve 
our sympathy for the distress or disability their disorders may produce, 
but they equally deserve our condemnation if they act on their urges and 
hurt innocent victims to satisfy their desires. 
In addition to being responsible agents, sexual predators do not pose a 
76 See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 139-40 (1993) ("At pres-
ent, we have no adequate theory of the substantive rationality of goals or desires 
. .. . " ). 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 65-67; cf. Ronet Bachman et al. , The Ration-
ality of Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/Rational Choice Conception of Sexual 
Assault, 26 LAw & Soc'y REv. 343 (1992) (finding in a study of conditions that would 
affect the likelihood of committing sexual assault that both perceived risk of formal 
sanction and moral evaluation of the act had a significant restraining effect). 
78 See MORSE 'S MENTAL DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL§ 1.3 (on file in the author's head) . 
79 See DSM-IV, supra note 34, at 530. 
80 See, e.g. , Brooks, supra note 39, at 730-32 (arguing that the Washington legisla-
ture chose to use the term "mental abnormality" in the Sexually Violent Predator 
statute to bring within the scope of that statute individuals with impaired volitional 
controls). Lack of control appears to be the dominant operative excusing condition 
that Brooks employs, but the empirical foundation is almost nonexistent and the theo-
ry is not conceptually supported. 1 
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sufficiently high risk of future harm, compared to other violent offenders, 
to warrant a distinctive form of preventive detention. It is difficult to 
obtain valid data about recidivism in general and about sexual offenses in 
particular, and little is know about sexual recidivism.81 The underreport-
ing of sex offenses leads to practical difficulties in designing and con-
ducting useful studies of sexual recidivism. Thus, all reported data must 
be considered with caution. 
The most recent meta-analysis of sexual offender treatment studies dis-
covered, on the basis of very few studies with disparate types of sex of-
fenders, that the sexual recidivism rate measured by official reports was 
nineteen percent for treated offenders and twenty-seven percent for un-
treated offenders.82 Particular variables may increase the probability of 
sexual recidivism among certain types of offenders,83 but data suggesting 
different recidivism rates for different types of sexual offenders are limit-
ed and inconclusive.84 Moreover, most recidivism in general, even by vio-
lent offenders, is nonviolent.85 The inference from the best evidence is 
that sexual offenders are not more likely to recidivate than other violent 
offenders.86 Even long-term rates do not suggest that they are a class 
specially prone to violent recidivism. And finally, highly accurate predic-
tion of future sexual recidivism, like the successful prediction of violence 
generally, is currently beyond our capability.87 
81 Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PsYCHOL. BuLL. 3, 4, 
27 (1989). 
82 Gordon C.N. Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Analysis of 
Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. CoNSULTING & CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 802, 806 (1995). 
Nonsexual recidivism was not reported. 
83 See Robert A. Prentky et al., Predictive Validity of Lifestyle Impulsivity for Rap-
ists, 22 CRIM. JusT. & BEHAV. 106 (1995) (reporting that high impulsivity had high 
predictive validity for sexual reoffending among previously convicted rapists , as well 
as for reoffending in general, as this group committed an even greater number of 
nonsexual offenses). 
84 Furby et aL, supra note 81, at 27 (reviewing the few studies that do organize 
their samples by category type and calling for more sophistication in identifying of-
fender categories in recidivism research). 
85 See Steven D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Behavioral Prediction and 
the Problem of Incapacitation, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 441, 468 (1994) (reporting that in 
their study of recidivism, subsequent arrest offenses were more likely to be trivial 
than serious by more than a three-to-one ratio). 
86 See Scheingold et al., supra note 63, at 812 (reviewing recidivism statistics). 
87 See Gordon C.N. Hall, Prediction of Sexual Aggression, 10 CLINICAL PsYCHOL. 
REv. 229, 239 (1990) (noting that some predictive techniques hold promise, but pre-
diction of sexual aggression is still in an early stage of development, and concluding 
that (1) actuarial methods are superior to clinical prediction, and (2) past sexual ag-
gression against adults is the best predictor of future sexual aggression against adults); 
Vernon L. Quinsey et al., Predicting Sexual Offenses, in AssESSING DANGEROUSNEss: 
VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL OFFENDERS, BATTERERS, AND CHILD ABUSERS 114, 131-32 
(Jacquelyn C. Campbell ed., 1995) (agreeing with the overall assessment of the Furby 
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It would be helpful to know if sexual offenders are less versatile than 
other offenders. Successful prediction that the next criminal act of most 
offenders would be of the same type as their previous offense is difficult, 
because most offenders, probably including sexual offenders, do not limit 
themselves to just one type of crirne.88 If sexual predators are less versa-
tile, however, it would help predict specifically sexual recidivism. After 
all, assuming that the general recidivism rate of sexual predators does not 
differ from that of other offenders, the law's special concern about sexual 
predators must be sexual recidivism, rather than recidivism simpliciter. 
In the absence of more and better data about the versatility of sexual 
offenders, it is fair to assume that their crimes are not sufficiently limited 
to sexual offenses to increase predictive success substantially. 
The Washington statute's definition of "sexually violent offense" in-
cludes traditionally nonsexual offenses, such as kidnapping or burglary, if 
they are "sexually motivated. "89 Sexual motivation in turn is defined to 
mean that "one of the purposes for which the defendant committed the 
crime was for the purpose of his or her sexual gratification. "90 Inter-
preted broadly enough to include, say, "unconscious" sexual gratification, 
this definition might permit commitment for any potential violent recidi-
vism, whether or not it appeared directly linked to sexual violence. The 
statute is too vague and overbroad to permit accurate identification of 
those agents for whom it might be appropriate. Unnecessary, expensive, 
and potentially unconstitutional commitment is inevitable. 
Finally, although sexual predators are responsible and not especially 
violent, one might try to justify preventive detention because they are 
specially treatable. Of course, there is no reason that treatment could not 
be provided in prison, as it can be for other physical and mental "abnor-
malities," but there is anyway insufficient evidence to support this puta-
tive justification. Indeed, there is some reason to believe that there is a 
positive association between treatment for sexual offenders and the recid-
ivism rate, although the association may be artifactually produced.91 To 
the contrary, however, a more recent meta-analytic review of a small 
review, supra note 81, but claiming on the basis of one study that newer methods may 
enhance the accuracy of predictions of sexual recidivism in some groups). 
88 See MICHAEL R. GoTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSC H1, A GENERAL THEORY OF 
CRIME 91-94 (1 990) (reviewing "overwhelming" evidence of offender versatility rath-
er than specialization in crimes committed). 
89 WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 71.09.020 (West Supp. 1995). 
90 ld. § 9.94A.030(32). 
91 See Furby et al., supra note 81, at 24-25 (reporting in a review of sex offender 
recidivism research that eight of nine studies of untreated offenders show relatively 
low recidivism rates, while two-thirds of treated offender studies show relatively high 
recidivism rates, but noting that these results may in part derive from the likelihood 
that treated offenders were monitored more closely during these studies than untreat-
ed offenders, increasing the probability of being caught when reoffending). 
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number of studies found a positive, robust treatment effect for cognitive-
behavioral and hormonal treatments, but the effect size was small and 
heterogeneous across the studies, and treatment was most effective with 
outpatient participants .92 Even this limited study provides little optimism 
about the positive cost-benefit outcome of inpatient treatment for the se-
rious types of sexual predators that are allegedly appropriate candidates 
for potentially lifelong preventive detention. 
There are surely some violent sexual offenders who recidivate with sex-
ual violence reasonably narrowly defined. The evidence suggests, howev-
er, that sexual offenders are not a specially threatening or treatable class 
of violent offenders, and we cannot predict with reasonable accuracy 
which sexual offenders pose an unacceptably high risk for committing fur-
ther serious sexual violence. 
The civil commitment of sexual predators, who are responsible and are 
not especially likely to reoffend compared to other types of violent of-
fenders, weakens rather than reinforces the traditional civil/criminal con-
finement distinction. The indefinite civil detention of responsible but 
dangerous sexual predators might provide some social safety at great ex-
pense,93 but only by undermining the liberty the law usually accords to 
responsible citizens. Medicalization of violent sexual predation is legal 
prestidigitation that wrongly justifies the unjustifiable. 
If sexual predators and similar classes of potentially dangerous people 
are not civilly committable according to the traditional justifications and 
if it would be unjustifiable and undesirable to expand the criteria for civil 
commitment to include them, what should be done to protect society 
from the danger some of these offenders undeniably pose? It is to this 
question that this Paper now turns. 
IV. CRIMINAL PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF DANGE ROUS BUT 
RESPONSIBLE AGENT S 
If expanding civil commitment by broadening the criteria of nonre-
sponsibility is theoretically unjustifiable and if current predictive and 
treatment deficiencies render civil commitment inefficient, the problem 
dangerous people present persists. Does the criminal law offer accepta-
ble alternatives that would enhance safety without blurring the civil/crim-
inal distinction and without imposing disproportionate punishment? 
Imposing long sentences for large numbers of offenders is a currently 
favored means to achieve both justice and indirect preventive detention 
92 Hall, supra note 82, at 805-08. 
93 The sexual predator unit in Washington can preventively detain no more than 36 
men. La Fond, supra note 63, at 701. Given the recidivism rates of sex offenders, 
very little public safety is gained by this tiny program. To expand it considerably 
would be extremely expensive and would risk increasing the number of false positive 
commitments. 
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through incapacitation. 94 Can the proportionality of such sentences be 
justified, however?95 The argument for longer terms is that too many 
serious offenders are receiving or actually serving disproportionately 
short terms, which are far milder than they deserve. For example, if sexu-
al predators receive insufficient sentences, civil commitment appears 
needed to protect the public. If they served deserved long terms, howev-
er, the criminal justice system would not be punishing blameless offenders 
and civil commitment would not be necessary. 96 
The first objection to imposing allegedly deserved longer sentences is 
that the "argument" about desert is simply a conclusion, because retribu-
tive theory furnishes no adequate guide to the proportionate length of a 
sentence.97 Of course, no pure consequential theory furnishes a remotely 
precise guide either. The problem is unavoidable in setting all criminal 
penalties because virtually everyone accepts that retribution is a necessa-
ry, although not sufficient, justification for punishment. Even if there is 
no consensually accepted cardinal scale, however, legislatures can sensi-
94 The average prison time per violent crime tripled between 1975 and 1989. 
MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
17 (1995). Indeed, lengthier incarceration of greater numbers of offenders has result-
ed in almost a tripling of the prison population in the last fifteen years. /d. at 40. For 
a history of the recent dominance of the now regnant incapacitative rationale for con-
finement, see ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 3-17 (arguing that incapacita-
tive theory is not empirically supported and became popular through a passive pro-
cess of elimination rather than after active academic and political debate). 
95 There is no question about the current constitutionality of almost any term of 
years a legislature sees fit to impose for virtually any offense. Even the most draco-
nian terms of years appear to be within the legislative prerogative. See Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence with-
out parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine may be cruel, but it is not unusu-
al under the Eighth Amendment because legislatures have adopted such severe, 
mandatory penalties in various forms throughout our nation's history). 
96 What counts as a serious offense is debatable. Paul Robinson and I, among 
many others, believe that many offenses are punishable by terms of years that are 
disproportionate because the notion of desert that supports them is too harsh or be-
cause their length reflects a pure preventive detention component that is unrelated to 
desert for the current offense. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 714-16 (arguing that a 
purge of dangerousness considerations from criminal sentencing would significantly 
enhance the moral credibility of that system); see also ToNRY, supra note 94, at 19-24, 
196-201 (noting the disproportionality of sentencing in the United States, arguing that 
such harsh sentencing has had little effect on crime rates, and advocating a reversal in 
the trend of increases in penalties). 
97 See, e.g. , David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 9 UCLA L. REv. 
1623, 1636-42 (1992) (arguing that retributivism cannot proscribe what punishment 
any particular crime deserves, what the penalty for the least serious offense in a 
ranked list of offenses should be, and by how much to increase the penalty for each 
successive crime on such a list). 
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bly rank offenses according to their perceived seriousness98 and can try 
with argument and empathy to apportion punishments accordingly.99 If 
legislatures engage in this process carefully and upon serious reflection, 
one cannot justify the resulting punishments as "really" proportionate be-
cause they are consistent with some metaphysical tablet in the sky, but 
they will satisfy reasonable expectations for justice in a liberal democracy. 
Legislatures often respond unjustifiably harshly to "the crime problem," 
but this is not a necessary outcome of a retributive justification for pun-
ishment. No extant theory can conclusively demonstrate logically or em-
pirically that any particular term of years is disproportionate for any 
crime. Nonetheless, justifiable proportionality can be achieved. 
Another objection to imposing lengthy sentences on serious offenders 
is that many of the potentially dangerous convicts are young first offend-
ers. Lengthy sentences for them are inappropriate, it is urged, because 
youth and lack of a serious prior record diminish their culpability. Conse-
quently, younger criminals should be put on probation or given shorter 
sentences. But giving youthful offenders comparatively brief sentences 
ensures their release during the stage of their lives in which they are most 
vulnerable to reoffending in general and violent reoffending in particu-
lar.100 This is an undesirable outcome for those committed to using 
lengthier deserved sentences to accomplish preventive restraint. 
98 See BuREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, REPORT TO THE 
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 16-17 (2d ed. 1988) (reporting results of the National 
Survey of Crime Severity, showing that a stratified national sample of the U.S. popu-
lation demonstrates substantial nationwide agreement about the severity rankings of 
various crimes). But see David A. Parton et al., Measuring Crime Seriousness: L es-
sons from the National Survey of Crime Severity, 31 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 72 (1991) 
(discussing theoretical and methodological limitations of the National Survey of 
Crime Severity). 
99 See, e.g. , Michael Davis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, in To 
MAKE THE PuNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE 77-83 (1992). 
100 See generally DanielS. Nagin & David P. Farrington, The Onset and Persistence 
of Offending, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 501 (1992) (finding an inverse relationship between 
the age of onset of criminal behavior and persistence of offending attributable to 
time-stable individual differences); DanielS. Nagin & David P. Farrington, The Stabil-
ity of Criminal Potential from Childhood to Adulthood, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1992) 
(concluding, based on a long panel data set, that the positive association between past 
and future criminal behavior is attributable largely to stable, unmeas ured individual 
differences) ; DanielS. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, On the Relationship of Past to 
Future Participation in Delinquency, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1991) (concluding based 
on a short panel data set that the principal explanation for the positive relationship 
between past and future delinquency is state dependence, the effect of past criminal 
experience reducing inhibitions against engaging in future delinquent acts); see also 
Christy A. Visher et al., Predicting the Recidivism of Serious Youthful Offenders Using 
Survival Models , 29 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1991) (identifying variables associated with 
recidivism and assigning "statistically reasonable" risk functions to individuals). 
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The most general response is to rethink the influence of age on culpa-
bility. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of imposing 
the death penalty on convicts who committed their capital offenses when 
they were sixteen or seventeen years old. 101 Although I believe that this 
holding is vastly too harsh, it does suggest that waving larger numbers of 
older, serious juvenile offenders into the adult criminal justice system and 
then imposing on them substantial terms of years would be morally and 
legally acceptable to the public/02 and it surely would be constitutional. 
There is no systematic empirical evidence comparing adult and adoles-
cent decisionmaking concerning criminal conduct. 103 Some evidence 
about adolescent decisionmaking suggests, however, that adolescents may 
be more peer oriented, steeper time discounters, and more risk-preferring 
than adults, 104 but this does not logically imply that adolescents as a class 
are less responsible than adults. Even if such differences are robust, they 
may not diminish responsibility according to some normative models. 
For those who adopt such an unforgiving normative view of responsibili-
ty, lengthy terms, especially for older adolescents, would arguably be de-
served and would keep youthful violent offenders incarcerated beyond 
the most vulnerable stage for reoffending. Some released later in life 
would nonetheless commit violent offenses, but violence is mostly a 
young person's activity, and these cases would be comparatively rare. 105 
Although imposing longer terms on more offenders might not be unfair 
and would increase preventive restraint, it presents enonnous problems. 
The ability to predict violent recidivism is limited, many of those incarcer-
ated would not reoffend, and the vast majority of recidivism will not be 
serious, violent crime.106 Criminals released after long sentences will 
101 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition 
of capital punishment in such a case is not violative of the Eighth Amendment). 
102 Indeed, this is already happening. Between 1988 and 1992, the number of juve-
nile cases of crimes against the person judicially waved to criminal court doubled. 
HowARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SrcKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, JuvENILE OF-
FENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 154 (1995). 
103 See Elizabeth S. Scott et al. , Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal 
Contexts , 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 221,238 (1995) (noting only a single comparative 
study of this type). 
104 !d. at 229-35 (reviewing research comparing conformity and compliance in rela-
tion to peers and parents, attitudes toward risk, and temporal perspectives of adoles-
cents and adults). 
105 For those who believe-as I do not-that an offender's prior record should 
properly be a factor in the culpability assessment for the present offense, disclosure of 
the juvenile record would also result in lengthier sentences because many younger 
offenders have records of serious offenses committed while they were juveniles. 
Among those who believe that prior record is relevant, many would deny that a juve-
nile record qualifies, because they believe that juveniles are not fully responsible for 
their deeds. 
106 See Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 85, at 468 (reporting that 22.4% of 
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have few skills and fewer prospects. Lives will be wasted. Maximum se-
curity institutions are ghastly places. The burden of such a scheme will 
fall largely on poor and minority criminals. Nonetheless, if one thinks 
that all offenders-even young offenders-deserve lengthy sentences, 
criminal punishment's incapacitative effect would have the additional 
benefit of providing preventive detention. 
Another influential proposal for taking desert into account and permit-
ting preventive restraint within the criminal justice system is based on a 
mixed retributive and consequential theory of punishment.107 According 
to this view, because retributive theory furnishes no precise guide for pro-
portionate sentences, it can only suggest a proportionate range for each 
crime, a range that in principle can be very broad. Any sentence within 
that range will be proportionate. The sentencing authority can then take 
dangerousness into account by setting the penalty within this range. 
More dangerous offenders will receive sentences tending towards the 
high end of the range, which can be very high, and vice versa. Many are 
satisfied that this proposal properly balances justice to the offender and 
social safety, but I am less convinced.108 
The proposal is too skeptical about the possibility of proportionate jus-
tice and suffers from the usual predictive difficulties. Although I agree 
that no theory furnishes a precise guide to highly specific sentences, per-
mitting wide ranges for the same crime in effect abandons the quest for 
proportion and equality. Moreover, wide ranges will permit both unduly 
harsh punishment and substantially disparate sentences for the same 
crime based on predictions of future dangerousness that are likely to be 
quite inaccurate, even for seemingly high risk offenders. And when in 
doubt, the most conservative course will be to predict danger and incar-
cerate longer. After all, the offender allegedly cannot justifiably com-
plain that a longer sentence within the "proportionate" range is dispro-
portionate. In sum, many offenders will languish in prison for far longer 
than desert requires-the bottom of the proportionate range is not too 
retributively lenient by definition-and far longer than social safety re-
quires as well. Of course, if the range is narrowed substantially, the pro-
their sample, followed for more than 25 years, never reoffended, and subsequent of-
fenses were trivial rather than serious by more than a three-to-one ratio); see also 
James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME 489, 492-93 (Ja.rnes Q. Wilson & 
Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) (reporting consistent findings that about 6% of boys of a 
given age conunit about half of all the serious crime conunitted by boys of that age, 
suggesting that the group of potential reoffenders consists of only a small number of 
individuals) . 
107 See generally NoRVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 148-60, 
168-72, 183-87, 196-206 (1982); Morris & Miller, supra note 68, at 37-38. 
108 For a more complete critique, see Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Crazi-
ness, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1485, 1493-1503 (1984) (exploring the theoretical and practical 
problems besetting Professor Morris's proposal). 
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posal is much less objectionable, but then the sentencing scheme has less 
flexibility to provide preventive restraint. 
The supposed need for preventive detention has also produced the 
classic criminal justice responses of habitual offender laws and selective 
incapacitation of alleged "career criminals."109 In both cases, convicted 
criminals with prior records are punished more harshly than the average 
offender convicted for the same offense. A debate rages about the fair-
ness and efficiency of either scheme.110 Because my preferred theory of 
punishment suggests that we should punish for acts, not for character or 
disposition, and that offenders convicted of the same crime should be 
treated alike, I would not adopt either scheme as a method of criminal 
punishment.111 
Although this is not the appropriate forum for a defense of act retribu-
tivism, a brief explanation may be helpful. 112 When an offender has 
served the sentence for a crime, the "slate is wiped clean."113 The next 
109 See, e.g. , Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (holding that issues of 
the mechanics of recidivist statutes and the degree of punishment under them are 
within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence for the possession of 
650 grams or more of certain controlled substances is not violative of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
110 See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 68, at 3-17 (exploring the rise in 
incapacitation as today's principal justification for imprisonment in America) . See 
generally Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation: More At Stake Than 
Controlling Violent Crime, 62 UMKC L. REv. 107 (1993) (arguing that general and 
selective incapacitation are not legitimate exercises of governmental authority in a 
reasonably affluent, democratic society); Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of 
Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals , 16 
HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 329 (1989) (arguing that courts and legislatures should engage 
in explicit risk analysis with respect to potentially dangerous people, balancing the 
risk of harm against the person's liberty interest) ; David Wood, Dangerous Offenders, 
and the Morality of Protective Sentencing , 1988 CRIM. L. REv. 424 (arguing that crimi-
nal protective sentencing is unjustifiable, but that the civil detention of people identi-
fied as dangerous may be justified under certain conditions); Markus D. Dubber, 
Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California's 
Habitual Criminal Statute , 43 STAN. L. REv. 193 (1990) (arguing that California's Ha-
bitual Criminal statute is inconsistent with the punishment theories of retribution, 
rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation, and urging California courts to inter-
pret the statute as narrowly as possible). 
111 See Morse, supra note 108, at 1494-1502, 1505-07. 
112 Those adamantly opposed to act retributivism as a necessary and sufficient or 
as a necessary and limiting justification for punishment will not be convinced, but 
perhaps pause may be given. 
113 Charging practices, plea bargaining, and other vagaries of the criminal justice 
system undermine this claim, but they also undermine more consequential claims 
about appropriate incapacitation and deterrence. The argument proves too much. It 
is plausible but ultimately unproductive to reject all arguments derived from the vari- 1 
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offense of a previous offender is no worse per se, the victim is no more 
harmed, than if the offense were the offender's first. The multiple offend-
er demonstrates greater antisocial tendencies, is at greater risk for reof-
fending, and cumulatively causes society more harm than an offender 
who offends only once or a few times, but having antisocial tendencies is 
not a punishable offense in the United States. The multiple offender will 
also spend a great deal more aggregate time incarcerated, even in the 
absence of habitual offender enhancement or selective incapacitation. 
These sentencing schemes impose additional incarceration because we 
believe that the defendant is dangerous and should be preventively de-
tained, not because the defendant deserves more punishment for the in-
stant offense. The argument that the multiple offender's latest crime is 
more blameworthy than the same crime committed by others or than his 
previous crimes is a salve to the residual retributivist conscience that 
seems to lurk in most people. It is simply unconvincing. 
Even if one agrees with the foregoing brief argument-and many, of 
course, do not-it is plausible to claim that multiple offenders are on no-
tice that they may be preventively detained. Consequently, by reoffend-
ing they waive the moral right to proportionate criminal punishment.114 
This claim initially appears attractive because it seems to justify preven-
tive detention within the criminal justice system. Upon further reflection, 
however, the claim has a moral drawback, and it again blurs the civil! 
criminal distinction. 
The moral drawback is that the state should not act immorally by pun-
ishing too harshly, even if the criminal "consents." Disproportionate 
punishment is simply wrong. People can of course consent to the risk of 
harms being imposed on them. The law allows boxers to box and patients 
to undergo life-endangering medical treatments. In such cases, however, 
the activity is itself morally and legally acceptable. When the activity is 
not acceptable-homicide or aggravated assault, for example-the law 
does not allow the victim's consent to justify the conduct. It is still wrong 
and the harmdoer will be punished. Similarly, disproportionate punish-
ment is wrong, even if the criminal "consents" by committing the crime. 
Furthermore, if enhanced punishment is not deserved, the additional in-
ous justifications for punishment on the ground that the criminal justice system is too 
flawed to permit any coherent theoretical argumentation about it. 
114 See C.S. Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, 12 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 289, 
293-300 (1983) (presenting a justification for punishment based on the theory that 
offenders consent to forgo their immunity from punishment by committing criminal 
acts) . Larry Alexander suggests that consent has draconian implications, in that it can 
justify any punishment, no matter how disproportionate. Larry Alexander, Consent, 
Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 178, 179-82 (1986). But see 
C.S. Nino, Does Consent Override Proportionality?, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 183 (1986) 
(responding to Alexander's critique by setting forth and discussing some of the 
presuppositions of his own thesis). 
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carceration is for dangerousness, not for culpability, and thus the addition 
is not punishment. It is pure preventive detention imposed under the 
guise of criminal punishment. 
Standard sentences for responsible multiple offenders, followed by civil 
commitment, would solve the problem only superficially.115 This scheme 
cleanly maintains the civil/criminal distinction, but as the discussions of 
sexual predator commitments116 and predictive inaccuracy117 disclosed, 
such commitments are unjustified. Again, one could try to claim that the 
multiple offender is on notice that civil commitment may follow imprison-
ment. By reoffending the offender therefore waives the usual right to be 
committed only if (1) the offender is dangerous and nonresponsible, and 
(2) the prediction technology is highly accurate. But most of these of-
fenders are responsible and predictive accuracy is poor. If it is wrong for 
the state either to civilly commit responsible agents or to impose preven-
tive detention in the absence of predictive accuracy, it should not do so, 
even if the agent in question has assumed the risk. Civil commitment of 
the multiple offender who "consents" to unjust preventive detention is 
itself unjust. 
Finally, habitual offender laws, including "three strikes and you're 
out," are unlikely to have the desired effect. Given the relatively low 
probability of arrest and successful prosecution for the most serious 
crimes, save homicide, most offenders convicted of a third serious offense 
will be at or past the age at which the probability of committing further 
serious crimes decreases rapidly.U8 Thus, we will spend huge sums of 
money keeping criminals in prison for draconian terms at just the time in 
their lives when the risk they pose finally diminishes. 119 Moreover, these 
laws can have unintended, deleterious consequences, such as clogging the 
115 Paul Robinson, who prefers this solution, raises the compelling point that civil 
commitment has the attractive feature of periodic review, whereas lengthy sentences 
do not. Thus, civil commitment may protect the liberty of dangerous offenders more 
than criminal incarceration. Robinson, supra note 1, at 715. This is true under cur-
rent legal arrangements, but if offenders deserve lengthy sentences, see supra text 
accompanying notes 94-96, the absence of periodic review does not endanger their 
liberty. Furthermore, there is nothing to prevent a state from allowing periodic re-
view of enhanced sentences, although doing so blurs the civil/criminal distinction by 
reintroducing the risk of future violent conduct as a criterion for determining the 
proper length of a sentence. 
116 See supra Part III.C. 
117 See supra Part liLA. 
118 James Q. Wilson, What to Do About Crime, CoMMENTARY, Sept. 1994, at 25, 
28 (noting that the peak ages of criminality are between 16 and 18). 
119 See United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1199 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (arguing that life imprisonment for a 35 year old four-time armed robber 
is too harsh because the likelihood that he would commit armed robbery if released at 
age 55 after a proposed 20 year sentence is very low). 
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courts 120 and increasing dangerous conditions in prison. 121 
Perhaps habitual offender laws would be worth the cost if they had a 
sufficiently strong deterrent effect, but this is doubtful. Furthermore, bet-
ter alternatives are available. Repeat offenders are just the type of impul-
sive, antisocial agents for whom deterrence has the least effect. If they 
were given and served reasonably lengthy, but not unduly harsh, 
sentences for their previous offenses and for their "third strike" offense, 
they would spend more of their vulnerable years behind bars and 
equivalent deterrence would be accomplished. They also would not have 
to be expensively and unnecessarily incarcerated for life. 
Before concluding the discussion of enhanced criminal detention, as-
sessment of the justice of this alternative requires brief mention of the 
immense number of social interventions that might reduce the dangerous 
propensities of the populace and, consequently, that might diminish the 
need for either criminal or civil incarceration. Gun control and reducing 
poverty and inequality are favorite candidates, as are programs that dis-
courage early childbearing and encourage the formation and mainte-
nance of two-parent families. Each of these solutions has defenders and 
detractors, but the purpose of noting them is not to advocate particular 
interventions. Rather, it is to highlight again that seeking social safety by 
preventive detention in either the criminal or civil system may cause soci-
ety to ignore potentially less intrusive means of preventing harm. Ulti-
mately, even if nothing is done, the responsible offender still deserves 
proportionate punishment, but many of us would feel far more comforta-
ble imposing the deserved punishment if society had done more to pre-
vent offenses from occurring at all. 
V. PURE PREVENTIVE DETENTIO N OF RESPO NSIBLE AND BLAMELESS, 
BU T D A NGEROU S AGENTS 
To safeguard the liberty of potential offenders, how much risk must we 
impose on potential, innocent victims? Should we confine potential of-
fenders on the ground that their liberty to behave as they wish simply 
does not outweigh our liberty to be safe from the harm they will produce? 
Have we reached a stage of sufficient social peril and sufficient predictive 
accuracy to abandon the charade of nonresponsibility and to adopt civil 
preventive detention of responsible, currently blameless people purely on 
12° Fox Butterfield, '3 Strikes' Law in California Is Clogging Courts and Jails , N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at A1 , Bll (reporting that whereas 94 % of felony cases in 
California used to be handled by plea bargain, after passage of that state's habitual 
offender statute, only 14% of second-strike cases and 6% of third-strike cases were 
disposed of by plea bargain). 
121 See Bruce Porter, Terror on an Eight-Hour Shift, N.Y. TIME S, Nov. 26, 1995, § 6 
(Magazine) , at 42, 44 (describing the increasing levels of rage and violence in prisons 
and attributing the increase to the lengthier terms prisoners now must serve) . 
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the ground that they are dangerous? For many people, this is the hardest 
question, the practice most difficult to justify. 
Pure preventive detention does not satisfy the criteria for traditional 
civil or criminal confinement-the person posing sufficient risk for suffi-
cient harmdoing is responsible and blameless-and thus it must be seen 
as an extended form of civil commitment. As such, pure preventive de-
tention should be imposed only if there is no reasonable, less intrusive 
alternative to prevent harm and the conditions of confinement are 
nonpunitive. I recognize that these are contestable conditions that would 
require difficult line-drawing, but let us imagine an easy case: In the ab-
sence of detention, to prevent harmdoing would require a police officer 
always at the potential harmdoer's elbow. As this is impractical, imagine 
that the detainee is confined in a decent, cheap, hotel-like place, with 
reasonable food, exercise, medical care, conjugal visits, and the like. As-
sume that strict procedural requirements govern pure preventive deten-
tion proceedings and that detainees are granted the right to frequent peri-
odic review to determine if they continue to pose a danger. 
If all these constraints on pure preventive detention obtain, why 
shouldn't the law confine the potentially dangerous but responsible 
agent? It is hard to imagine a convincing liberty argument for allowing 
the potential harmdoer freedom to inflict great harm if the risk to others 
is sufficiently high and predictable. Under such conditions, the commit-
ment would be cost-benefit justified and the potentially dangerous per-
son's liberty right would be trumped. 122 
Short of absolute certainty, there will always be false positives. Never-
theless, if the rate of such errors were low enough, one can imagine 
agreeing behind the veil of ignorance to a scheme that imposes a small 
risk of wrongful preventive detention, but thereby produces a great in-
crease in safety for all. This is an unsettling conclusion-it would be 
comforting to believe that the right of responsible adults to pursue their 
projects would be absolute unless they violated the criminal law-but I 
122 Alex Brooks, Michael Corrado, and Ferdinand Schoeman agree. See Brooks, 
supra note 39, at 752-54 (arguing that such commitment is not only cost-benefit justi-
fied, but also morally acceptable); Corrado, supra note 1 (manuscript at 11, 14) (bal-
ancing the lost freedom of future victims if the state does not detain a potentially 
dangerous person with that person's loss of liberty if detained); Schoeman, supra note 
1, at 27, 32 (analogizing preventive detention to the cost-benefit decision of quaran-
tine situations). 
Corrado and Schoeman also suggest that in appropriate cases the state owes com-
pensation to people purely preventively detained. See Corrado, supra note 1, at 10, 
25-28 (describing compensation as a means to protect the detainee's right to his lost 
freedom and as a check upon state action); Schoeman, supra note 1, at 31 (identifying 
compensation as an issue to be considered in a civil preventive detention system). But 
see Davis, supra note 23, at 95-96 & n.27 (arguing that such incarceration is criminal, 
not civil, and that the state does not owe the detainee compensation). I test this sug-
gestion in Part VI, infra. 
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believe that it is unavoidable. Although, once again, predictability is not 
inconsistent with responsibility, pure preventive detention threatens to 
dehumanize the detainee, treating him as if he were simply a dangerous 
animal, what Michael Corrado terms a "wild beast of prey,"123 rather 
than as an autonomous moral agent. Nevertheless, if a small risk of 
wrongful conviction is permissible in the criminal justice system, as it 
surely is , then a similar risk should be permissible in a pure preventive 
detention system that is appropriately limited in scope and administered 
with strict procedural protections.124 
Pure preventive civil detention is justifiable in principle, but should a 
state adopt it? Assuming that the risk criterion can be sufficiently de-
fined to avoid vagueness concerns and that only the risk of serious vio-
lence warrants the practice, what level of certainty short of absolute cer-
tainty should be required to justify pure preventive detention, and do we 
possess the technology to make such predictions accurately? 
The ultimate answers depend on moral and political theories that are 
always contestable and the available empirical evidence. Our society's 
strong presumption in favor of liberty suggests, however, that pure pre-
ventive detention is not warranted, because even the lowest possible level 
of certainty about serious violence that might warrant pure preventive 
detention is beyond our ability. The false positive rate would be astro-
nomical, leading to the costly detention of large numbers of people who 
would not cause harm and whose potential to pursue their own projects 
and to make a positive contribution to society would be aborted. Even if 
pure preventive detention were limited to the most serious offenses and 
to offenders from the highest risk groups who had actually committed 
sufficiently serious crimes and who were currently uttering threats, pre-
dictive accuracy about such low base-rate offenses would increase, but 
only slightly, as most such offenders do not recidivate or recidivate non-
seriously. Some reoffend repeatedly and seriously, but we cannot accu-
rately identify that group in advance. 125 The false positive rate would still 
be far too high, leading to inevitable, unjust overcomrnitment. And, once 
again, pure preventive detention will be a safety valve that enables socie-
ty to devote less attention and fewer resources to alternative means of 
reducing violence. 
12 3 Corrado, supra note 1, at 1 n.l. 
12 4 An equally clear and unsettling related conclusion is that potentially dangerous 
people need not cause or threaten harm to justify pure preventive detention. Detain-
ing people who have not given any direct indication that they might behave danger-
ously would be justified if the predictive technology were accurate enough. 
125 See Wilson, supra note 106, at 492 (noting that criminologists have identified 
characteristics of the group of youths who will commit serious crimes, but acknowl-
edging that predictive technology is too imprecise to identify the particular members 
of this group). 
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VI. A MoDEST PROPOSAL 
Consider the following purely heuristic proposal to extend the crime of 
reckless endangerment.126 Here are the elements of the new crime: (1) 
prior conviction of at least one serious crime of violence, or at least one 
prior occurrence of involuntary civil commitment for actual serious vio-
lent conduct; (2) conscious awareness of an extremely high risk that the 
agent will in the immediate future cause substantial unjustified harm; and 
(3) failure to commit oneself voluntarily or to take other reasonably ef-
fective steps to avoid causing future harm. The crime is complete when 
the agent recklessly fails to take the steps reasonably necessary to avoid 
harmdoing. 127 The term of imprisonment should be relatively short, but 
at the end of each term, a still-dangerous convict would be exposed to 
criminal liability again unless he or she took the appropriate steps. 
The justification for criminalization is this: No one has a right to harm 
others unjustifiably and people who are consciously aware of an extreme-
ly high risk that they will do so have a moral duty to avoid unjustifiable 
harmdoing by taking preventive action. Like Odysseus, they must tie 
themselves to the mast. Omitting to take appropriate action under the 
circumstances is a culpable moral failure that imperils others and fairly 
justifies criminalization and punishment.128 The requirement of prior 
126 Cf MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 211.2 (1985) (Recklessly Endangering Another Per-
son). I characterize the proposal as "purely heuristic" because it would be wildly 
intrusive and a nightmare to administer, and I would therefore not adopt it. It raises 
theoretically interesting issues, however, and provides an interesting comparison to 
schemes of civil preventive detention that try to accomplish similar goals of protecting 
society from potential harmdoers. 
127 I have used this hypothetical in class for years, but learned after writing this 
Part that Michael Davis recently and independently has made a very similar proposal. 
Professor Davis's paper has since been published and should be compared with the 
present Part. See Davis, supra note 23. In brief, rather than treating the proposal as a 
heuristic device, Davis argues that criminal punishment is genuinely warranted and, 
indeed, is a proper response to such cases. He argues that Schoeman's justification 
for pure civil detention fails , even if all the technological and procedural problems 
were solved. As the last Part makes clear, I tend to agree with Schoeman. As the 
present Part suggests, however, expanding reckless endangerment is not a theoretical-
ly unthinkable alternative to pure preventive detention, although enforcing it would 
be nightmarish. 
128 Consider the following further hypothetical. Imagine that an agent is con-
sciously aware of a substantial risk that he has a deadly, highly communicable disease 
that is transmitted by normal social interaction. Transmission can be prevented, how-
ever, by simple means that allow the agent safely to engage in normal social interac-
tion. Suppose he fails to take those steps and communicates the disease with con-
scious awareness of a substantial risk that he would communicate it. The victim dies. 
Is a conviction for involuntary manslaughter or murder unjustifiable? If not, is it 
unthinkable to consider the omission to take the necessary steps to prevent communi-
cation sufficient to warrant conviction and punishment for reckless endangerment? 
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conviction or involuntary commitment for dangerous behavior protects a 
defendant with no prior record from possibly unfair convictions and helps 
the prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the risk. 
The requirement of conscious awareness of an extremely high risk im-
poses liability only on subjectively culpable agents and only when the risk 
of harm is extraordinarily high.129 Without doubt, violations will often 
not come to the attention of the criminal justice system, and, also without 
doubt, proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the requisite mental state and 
omission might be difficult in many cases.130 Nonetheless, in clear cases 
criminal conviction and incarceration for a short period would be de-
served.131 
Let us see whether the elements and the justification apply to the con 
and the patient, whose stories introduced this Paper. The con intends to 
commit more armed robbery and says that he will kill if necessary, 
although he may do neither. Until he acts, his purpose to rob and kill is 
to some degree conditional and may be renounced.132 At the least, how-
ever, he is consciously aware of a risk that he will. It then becomes his 
duty voluntarily to commit himself, presumably in a nonpunitive but se-
cure institution, or to take other reasonable steps that would prevent him 
from robbing and killing, such as placing himself in a halfway house 
under intensive supervision. Why is it unfair under threat of punishment 
to require him to bind himself to the mast, to take steps to avoid harmdo-
ing? If he takes no steps, shouldn't he be found culpable for his failure 
and incarcerated? 
The patient, too, knows that he is at great risk for relapse if he decides 
to discontinue taking his medication and that violent conduct is highly 
likely to ensue. Thus, if the patient decides to stop taking his medication 
for rational reasons, such as the dislike of relatively minor but inconve-
The criminal law already includes prohibitions against the active intentional or reck-
less transmission of some serious diseases. See, e.g., Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (affirming HIV-positive defendant's conviction for attempted murder by 
spitting at the victim with intent to kill); Simon Bronitt, Spreading Disease and the 
Criminal Law, 1994 CRrM. L. REv. 21 (exploring the difficulties in bringing conduct 
which contributes to the spread of disease within the scope of the criminal law). 
129 Cf MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) (1985) (the Code's treatment of "willful 
blindness"). The section provides that knowledge of a particular fact is satisfied by 
knowledge of a high probability that the fact exists, unless the defendant actually 
believes that it does not exist. 
130 In part this will be true because the state will have to prove that harm was 
substantially likely, a predictive enterprise subject to all the difficulties this Paper has 
already discussed. Still, the defendant's awareness that he or she was likely to cause 
harm-which also must be proved-surely increases the predictability of the harm. 
131 Perhaps, contrary to my expectation, such a scheme would be widely 
( over)used. 
132 See Larry Alexander, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes 2-8 (1995) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
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nient side effects, he is then consciously aware of an unjustifiable risk that 
he will cause harm while crazy. What right does the patient have to pre-
fer avoiding minor side effects to avoiding harming others? Assuming 
that the reason for the omission was not crazy, the patient is culpable and 
would be imprisoned. 
The extended crime of reckless endangerment looks like civil detention 
for dangerous propensities, but there is a distinction. Although the crimi-
nal law is far more forgiving of morally culpable omissions than culpable 
actions, in appropriate cases the cri.!Pinal law does impose duties of af-
firmative action to prevent harm. The proposal suggests that the circum-
stances envisioned are appropriate cases for punishment because danger-
ous agents have no right to be at liberty to inflict harm without trying 
preventive measures if they are quite sure they will cause harm without 
such measures. If they fail to take steps to avert danger, they are culpa-
ble and deserve punishment. Nor does the crime punish simply for 
thoughts or propensities. Like other crimes of omission, it punishes for 
culpable failure to act.133 As a proposal, it seems far more compelling 
than avoiding famine by selling the children of the poor as food to feed 
the rich. 134 
CoNCLUSION 
The moral of the story can be briefly repeated. The legitimacy of both 
the criminal and civil confinement systems depends on maintaining the 
distinction between them. Criminal sanctions should be imposed only on 
culpable wrongdoers, and civil confinement should be reserved for 
nonresponsible agents who are dangerous and for whom confinement is 
cost-benefit justified. Various proposals to expand preventive detention 
threaten to excuse blameworthy defendants and preventively to detain 
large numbers of responsible people who will in fact pose no danger. De-
sirable conceptions of responsibility will be undermined. To avoid this 
result, indirect preventive detention accomplished by imposing arguably 
deserved, lengthy sentences on convicted criminals would work, and 
would help maintain a clear distinction between civil and criminal con-
finement, but would risk imposing punishments that might be too harsh. 
Moreover, readily available preventive detention may cause society to ig-
nore other, potentially fairer and more effective interventions to prevent 
violence. Pure preventive detention would also be unfair because sub-
133 Kevin Reitz suggested in a personal communication that this proposal is more 
intrusive than the other preventive detention schemes that I reject because it requires 
the potentially dangerous person to turn himself in. The proposal is intrusive and I 
would not in fact adopt it. But the offender's culpability justifies the intrusion and in 
most cases the potential harmdoer can probably avoid both prison and preventive 
detention by seeking less intrusive means to prevent harmdoing. 
134 JoNATHAN SwiFT, A MoDEST PROPOSAL (1729), reprinted in JoNATHAN SwiFT: 
A SELECTION OF Hrs WORKS 477 (Philip Pinkus ed., 1965). 
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stantial overcommitment would result. In sum, preventive detention will 
be unfair, expensive, and largely ineffective. Our society can devise bet-
ter means to protect us. 
